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INTRODUCTION 
1t is extremely difficult to deduce the Aristotelian sci-
entific procedure--to take, for example, his definition of sci-
ence or dialectic or of physics or mathematics, and to show 
that his actual method in a particular work is adequately ex-
plained by the initial definition. And yet, the actual sci-
entific method used by Aristotle is very much worth under-
standing. It will give us a deeper insight into the totality 
of Aristotle's work and will lead to a better understanding 
of much of the subsequent history of philosophical and scien-
tific thought. In the following study I have tried to discover 
the method at work in a particular scientific treatise. I have 
not, however, tried to reduce everything to a mere instance of 
a general theory' of the nature of science. Too many nuances would 
be rubbed away and an impression of simplicity and order created 
which would hardly be substantiated by an inspection of the 
text. 
Rather I have attempted to represent the process out ot 
which a scientific treatise has emerged. The work is Aristotle's 
Q! C&elo, more exactly the first book and a half of this work. 
1 
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It provides a doctrinal totality within itself and is brief 
enough to allow us to examine it in detail in the space at our 
disposal. 
The contents of the Q! Caelo may be summarized briefly as 
follows: books one and two present the science of the supra-
lunary world and the laws governing its motions; books three and 
four treat of the sublunary world, the world of generation 
and corruption, and the laws according to which the elements 
pass over one into the other. Within the first two books we 
have a possible tripartite division: through chapter six of 
book two, Aristotle develops his general doctrine of the heavens; 
chapters seven through twelve take up the problems of the stars; 
and in the final two chapters of the second book Aristotle con-
siders tne earth as a part of the system of the heavens. l Our 
concern will be primarily with his general doctrine of the 
heavens. 
To separate what is true from what is false in the Q! 
Cjelo would be an endless and, I believe, a fruitless task. 
Oalileo performed this criticism centuries ago, and there seems 
little reason to go back over his work. 2 What interests us here 
1 For a fuller summary of the oontents, see, Aristotelis De 
Caelo, Libri ~uattuor, edited and with introduction by D.J. --
Allan. OXfor, 1936, pp. ix-xii. 
2For Oalileots criticism of Aristotle, see Oalileo Galilei, 
Dialogue £n ~ Great World Systems, Salus bury translation re-
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is not the actual astronomy but rather the way in which ~deep 
and lastingly influential thinker went about trying to under-
stand the world. 3 
We must be careful not to generalize too facilely on the 
basis of the texts studied here. It the Aristotelian studies 
of the past generation have taught us anything it is that 
Aristotle is an ex~eedingly complex, sometimes apparently even 
contradictory thinker, and that quick generalizations about 
him are almost certain to be wrong. 4 In dealing with the nature 
and movements of the heavens, Aristotle is faced with uniquely 
difficult problems,5 and it would be highly uncritical for us 
to suppose that the techniques which he works out in the 
present context are characteristics of all of his scientific 
work. Nevertheless, the conclusions which we reach here ought at 
least to suggest que3tions and approaches tor further, more 
general study. 
vised, annotated, and with an introduction by Giorgio de San-
tillana (Chicago, 1953), p. 499, references to 'Aristotle.' 
3See Pierre Duhem, Le Slsti,e ~~, Histoire des Doc-
trines Coamologiqqes ~ PIaton Coeer~Paris,954r;-I:-r26-
130. 159-242, for an account of Aristotle as an astronomer. 
4See Howard Evan Runner, Develo~ment of Aristotle Illustrated 
from the Ear11es1C Bogks !at. lh!. l'hislqs (AmSterdam. 1951). PPel-;I. 
'That Aristotle was clearly.aware of the difficulties of 
the problems studied in the De Caelo is clear from ~~. An., 
I, " 644 b. 23-645 at 7. Tn; text is quoted below, on page 
53. 
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Within the scientific process of the first section of the 
Q! Caelo, I have marked off three moments--experience, question, 
and theory. I have tried to grasp the intelligibility of Aris-
totle's method by analyzing these components and then seeing 
them go together to form a scientific whole. This division 
cannot, for the present, seem anything but arbitrary. As we 
proceed, however, I think that we shall see that it is not 
without foundation. 
By taking this approach we shall come to a discussion of 
such topics as science and dialectic, conjecture and certitude. 
But we shall not take our point of departure from these con-
cepts, any more than did Aristotle when he worked out his science 
of the heavens. 
GHA?TER II 
EXPERIENCr.; IN THE DE CAELO 
_ ....... = ... 
In his logical work on the structure of science. Aristotle 
says of experience and science: "So out of sense-perception comes 
to be what we call memory, and out of frequently repeated memories 
of the same thing develops experience; for a number of memories 
constitute a single experience. From experience again--i.e. 
from the universal now stabilized in its entirety within the 
soul, the one beside the many whiCh is a single identity within 
thew. all--originate the skill of the craftsman and the knowledge 
of the man of science."l t'rom this we might conclude (and 
rightly) that a study and understanding of experience in Aris-
totle will be of the utmost importance for an understanding of 
his scientific method. 
Experience does not enter as a neatly packaged unit into 
the formati.on of the J1!. Caelo. It comes in both at the beginning 
and at the end of the scientifiC process, first as source then 
Ipost. Anal., II, 19, 100a, 4-9. Unless otherwise indicated, 
quotatIons from Aristotle are from, The Works of Aristotle Trans-
lated !lll2 En~lish, ed. W.D. Ross \Ox/ord, 1950:1952). 1~ vols. 
2nd ed. 
5 
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as justification of the science. As source it serves the 
double function of providing the data, the stuff of science, 
and the principles of the scientific deduction. at the end, 
it provides a Ineans of verifying the statementa advanced by.the 
scientific theorist. we shall examine in order these three as-
peets of experience: its role as source of data, its role as 
source of principles, and its role as means of verification. 
In the first place, then, experience provides the initial 
, 
data for scientific enquiry. This is merely to say that the 
world presents itself in experience as something potentially in-
telligible, which solicits the human mind to work out in detail 
the structure of this intelligibility. Aristotle develops this 
point in the early chapters of the :Metaphysics. l\len find them-
selves in a world that is ordered or structured in such and such 
a way, and their very situation in this world leads them to 
seek science: 
For all men begin, as we said, by wondering that things 
are as they are, as they do about self-moving mari-
onettes, or about the solstices or the incommensura-
bility of the diagonal of a square with the side; for 
it seems wonderful to all who have not yet seen the reason, 
that there is a thing which cannot be measured even by 
the smallest unit. But we must end in the contrary and. 
according to the proverb. the better state. as is the case 
in these instances too when men learn the cause; for there 
is nothing which would surprise a geometer so mych as 
it the diagonal turned out to be commensurable. 2 
2M,t .. A, 2, 98) a, 14-20. ct. also Me~., A, 1, 981 at 
29-)1; ~ •• It 1, 184 a, 9-27. 
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The stult ot 6xperience can be subjected to the working of 
undergtanding: it can be grasped according to principles. The 
view that the world ot experience 1s intelligible provides 
the guld1ne ideal tor Aristotlets scientific work. There are 
real answers to intellectually posed questions about our ambient 
world. 
The Q! Caclo torms part ot a general attempt to reduce the 
real to some sort ot intelligibility, or rather to discover 
the intelligibility tt~t 1s potentially there already. Aris-
totle does not ask here whether such a science is possiblo. 
This and similar questions he would reloe;ate to more basic 
studies, to the I!hx;sics and 11!tal?hX;siCS • .3 
The fact t!Ult Aristotle viewed experience in this way 1s 
hardly refiUU"'kable and scarcely needs further comment. An 
attitude ot this sort will stand at the beginning of almost 
any scientific endeavor. But what does requIre closer investI-
gation, aince it sets Aristotle off trom other traditions in 
sciencG, is the nature or quality of this initial experience. 
What preCisely are the g1 ven facta which Aristotle as a 
scientist considers himself obliged to incorporate into his 
3er• for example, PhIS., II, 8, which the Oxford translator 
haa entitled, ffDoes nature act for an end?" i"or an account of 
the pluce of the Q! Caelo within the totality ot Aristotelian 
SCience, see ,ii. Th9!W.8 ACQu;i.natis !!! Arlstcotel1a L!tti°a J1! f3e~r 
.!!i tlr.30 Expos~tlo. ed. naymundua g. ~piazzi, o.P. omae--, 5 , 
pp. -. The account may strike one as being somewhat more 
rational tha.n the facts warrant. 
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scientific synthesis? The question is crucial. The final 
pattern of a scientific system will be determined largely by 
what one takes as onets initial complexus of data. What needs 
explaining? In order better to understand the nature of the 
data in the Q! Clelo, let us first examine two texts from a 
closely related work, the ~ Generatione ~ Corruptione. They 
occur within a single chapter, and their apparent contradiction 
underlines the peculiar quality of Aristotle's experience: 
To resolve bodies into planes and no further--this, 
as we have also remarked elsewhere, is in itself a para-
dox. Hence there is more to be said for the view that 
there are indivisible bodies. Yet even these involve 
much of paradox. Still, as we have said, it is possible 
to construct 'alteration' and coming-to-be with them, 
if one 'transposes' 1h! !!m! by 'turning' and 'inter-
contact', and by the 'varieties of the figures', as 
Democritus does. (His denial of the reality of colour 
is a corollary from this position; for, according to 
him, things get coloured by 'turning' of the 'figures,.)4 
It is wrong, however, to suppose, as some assert, 
that coming-to-be and passing-away in the unqualified 
and complete sense are distinctively defined by 'as-
sociation' and 'dissociation', while the change that 
takes place in what is continuous is 'alteration'. 
On the contrary, this is where the whole error lies. 
For unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away are not 
effected by 'association' and 'dissociation'. They 
take place when a thing changes, from ~ to ~. as 
a whole.5 
vih.t it.ristotle apparently grants in tbe first text he takes back 
in the second. 'l'he contradiction, however, is only apparent. 
4Q! Gen. ~ Q2£., I, 2, 315 b, 32 - 316 a, 3. 
5Ibid. 317 a, 18-23. 
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It is possible, he first grants. to elaborate a theory which 
will cover all the facts, provided you mean nothing more by 
facts than what is materially given and verifiable. That out 
of an aggregate having such and such a size, shape, color, 
you can obtain another aggre8ate having a different size, shape, 
and color, simply on the basis of the hypotheses which Democritus 
wanted to make,--this Aristotle is willing to grant. But, as 
he insists in the second text, there is something more given, 
something more to be explained: fta thing changes, from .lb1! 
to that, as a whole." It is his insistance that this something 
more is a part of the data, and that as such it must be incor-
porated into one's scientific explanations, that sets Aristotle 
oif from aid materialistic predecessors and from many of his 
This somet..tliu6 morc is given in experience. It is the 
conception whicn the intelli6ent, observant man makes of 
the nature of events or things and which he expresses in words. 
Aristotle states the position most uncompromisingly in his 
Nicomachean Ethica: "The good man judges each class of things 
rightly, and in each the truth appears to him. n6 True, he is 
here talking about a class of phenomena which has its own 
6!!£. ~th., III, 4, 1113 a, 29-30. 
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peculiarities. V'ie cannot simply assume that what he says in 
an ethical study is completely pertinent in the natural sciences. 
But, as a matter of fact, we find a profoundly similar attitude 
toward the significance of the experience of the ordinary in-
telligent man in Aristotle's physical works. Relative to the 
~ Generatione, for example, it is the common judgment of men 
that when seed becomes a plant or a man the fact is that there 
was one thing and it became another thing. There was a change 
from this to that, as a whole. It is this fact; conceived in 
this way. that must be retained in an adequate scientific theory. 
This is the conception of experience which we find in the 
Q! Gaelo. we find it to a marked degree in the second chapter 
of the first book. Because of the manifold importance of this 
chapter. we quote it alrnost in full here: 
The question as to the nature of the whole, whether 
it is infinite ill size or limited. in its total mass, is 
a matter for subsequent inquiry. Vie will now speak of those 
parts of the whole which are specifically distinct. Let 
us take this as our starting-point. All natural bodies and 
magnitudes we hold to be, as such, capable of locomotion; 
tor nature, we say, 1s their principle of movement. But 
all movement that is in place, all locomotion, as we term 
it, is either straight or circular or a combination ot 
these two, which are the only simple movements. And the 
reason of this is that these two, the straight and the cir-
cular line, are the only simple magnitudes. Now revolution 
about the centre is circular motion, while the upward and 
downward movernents are in a straight line, 'upward' meaning 
motion away from the centre, and 'downward' motion towards 
it. All simple motion, then, must be motion either away 
trom or towards or about the centre. • • • 
Bodies are either Simple or compounded ot such; and 
by simple bodies I mean those which possess a principle of 
movellient in their own nature, such as fire and earth with 
11 
their kinds, and whatever is akin to them. Necessarily, 
then, movements also will be either simple or in some sort 
compound--simple in the case of the simple bodies, com-
pound in that of the composite--and in the latter case the 
motion will be that of the simple body which prevails in 
the composition. dupposing, then, that there is such a 
thing as simple movement, and that circular movement is an 
instance ot it, and that both movement of a simple body is 
simple and simple movement 1s of a simple body (for 1f 1t 
is movement of a compound it will be in virtue of a pre-
vailing simple element), then there must necessarily be some 
simple body which revolves naturally and in virtue of its 
own nature with a circular movement. By constraint, of 
course, it may be brought to move with the motion of some-
thing else different from itself, but it cannot so move 
naturally, since there is one sort of movement natural 
to each of the simple bodies. Again, if the unnatural 
movement is the contrary of the natural and a thing can 
have no more than one contrary, it will follow that circular 
movement, being a simple motion, must be unnatural, if it 
is not natural, to the body moved. If then (l) the body, . 
whose move •. ;,) ut is circular. 1s fire or some other element, 
its natural motion must be the contrary of the circular 
motion. But a single thing has a single contrary; and 
upward and downward motion are the contraries of one another. 
If, on the other hand, (2) the body moving with this circu-
lar motion which is unnatural to it is something different 
from the elements, there will be some other motion which 
is natural to it. But this cannot be. For if the natural 
motion is upward, it will be fire or air, and if downward, 
water or earth. Further. this circular motion is neces-
sarily primary_ For the perfect 1s naturally prior to the 
imperfect, and the circle is a perfect thing. This cannot 
be said of any straight line:--not of an infinite line; for, 
if it were perfect, it would have a limit and an end: nor 
of any finite line; for in every case there is something 
beyond it, since any finite 11ne can be extended. And so, 
since the prior movement belongs to the body which is 
naturally prior, and circular movement is prior to straight, 
and movement in a straight line belongs to simple bodies--
fire moving straight upward and earthy bodies straight down-
ward towards the centre--since this is so, it follows that 
circular movement also must be the movement of some simple 
body. For the movement of composite bodies is, as we said, 
determined by that simple body which preponderates in the 
composition. These premises clearly give the conclusion 
that there is in nature some bodily substance other than 
the formations we know, prior to them all and more divine 
12 
than they.7 
we shall return for a closer inspection of some of the 
argumentation later. What is important to note now is that 
basic to the argument is an experience typically Aristotelian. 
If one were to drop a somewhat heavy object, there would be a 
. 
general agreement among men that what happened was that the 
object fell down. Likewise, most men would find no difficulty 
in admitting that it is simply a fact that the flames of a fire 
rise up. We who live and think in a later scientific tradition 
see no difficulty in admitting this as a fact, but then ex-
plaining that fact aa something merely relative which may 
easily be transmuted by being placed in another explanatory 
context. To men like Galileo and Newton nothing seemed more 
evident than that the intelligibility that is given to experience 
in a judgment such as, "This object falls down, tf is relut.lve. 
For scientific purposes, other points of view can be introduced 
and made to yield results which would otherwise be unattainable. 
Newton, for example, makes it one of the fundamentals of his 
physics that experience ~ be so re-interpreted if we are to 
escape from the purely relative notions of space, time, motion, 
and attain to the Newtonian absolutes. g And if we study Galileots 
7~ Caelo, I, 2, 26g b, 12 - 269 a, 32. 
gSir Issac Newton's V~thematical Principles of Natural Philo-
sophy and hIs Sxstem If-the World, tr. Andrew Motti, revised and 
with an-ippendix by F orlan Cajori (Berkeley, 1946), pp. 6-12. 
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Dlalo~ue gn the Two Worlg JYstem§,we find that what often 
distinguishes Simplicius (the Aristotelian) from the other two 
speakers is his inability to view things from the non-common-
sense point of view. 9 
Be the subsequent history of scientific method what it may, 
Aristotle did not use the same' initiative and imagination in 
his handling of experience that we have grown used to. To him, 
the fact, the scientific fact, was that objects fall down. As 
J.M. LeBlond has observed, "Aristote n'exige donc, pas seulement 
de s'accorder avec certains faits, maia il veut qU'on rejoigne 
l'ensemble, et tout specialement les apparences qualitatives. 
Au fond, meme, il ne s'agit pas pour lui de rejoindre les faits: 
il s'agit de ne pas les quitter."lO We speak of the world as 
given. For Aristotle this expression would have methodological 
import: the ,scientist is essentially receptive or passive 
before experience. It is something that is given; it is not to 
90alileo Galilei, Dialogue 2n I!2 World Systems, p. 3g. 
n.32. the following judgment by an historian of science har-
monizes with the view we are taking here of the Aristotelian 
attitude toward experience: "The special oontribution that Gali-
leo's conoeption of science as a mathematical description of re-
lations enabled hifll: to make to methodology, was to free it from 
the tendency to exveusive empiricism which was the main defect 
or the Aristotelian tradition." A.C. Crombie, RObert Gro§set~ste 
and the ori~ins 2£>~X2!rimental Science: 1100-I1Qo (OXford, 
ffiJJ,p. ) 5. 
lOJ.M. LeBlond Logique!l Methode ~ Aristote: Etude !y£ 
la Recherche des pt!ncipes dan§ la Physique Aristot611clenne 
(raris, l~)~',p. 240 -
14 
be created. 
Such an attitude is in basic harmony with the many theore-
tical statements which Aristotle makes about the nature of sci-
ence. I.f the aim of science is to understand things in their 
ultimate causes, it can easily tend to suppose that the "things" 
11 
are already given in some pre-scientific experience. I do 
not suggest that the Aristotelian attitude toward experience 
is a necessary correlate ot his definition of science, but I 
do think that the attitude is abetted by the detinition. 
Aristotle's passivity toward experience is two-fold: in 
one direction it leads to a restriction or hypothetical bold-
ness. This we have already considered. In another direction 
it leads to a de-emphasis on "experimentation." There is no 
direct impetus given to expand experience. On several occasions 
~ the R! Caelo, Aristotle speaks of the difficulties caused 
12 him by a lack of precise or sufficient data. He does not. 
however, see in this an invitation or a challenge to discover 
ways of creating new experience which might lead to a definitive 
ll~., II, 3, 194 b, 19-23; De Part. An., I, 1, 640 a, 1. 
For further references, see Troy WiISon Organ, An Ind!x to 
Aristotle in Anglian TrIQalation (Princeton, 1949), p. 144. 
The entries of. this index are baaed upon the Oxford translation. 
12 De Ca8+0, I, J, 270 b, 13; II, 3. 286 a, 3-7; II, J 
287 b, J2-34. 
15 
solution of his problems. He sees it rather as an essential 
limitation of the human powers of knowing. 
This is not to say that he does not make use of what we 
would today call eXperimental data. To say that would be a 
drastic over-simplification. He not infrequently has occasion 
13 to use the astronomical data of his age. Even in the chapter 
quoted above, there are data which could hardly be called man on 
the street experience. That the heavens move in a circular path 
would hardly be a spontaneous judgment of the ordinarily intel-
ligent man, but it was the oommon view of the early astronomers. 
Aristotle does incorporate astronomical data, but what is sig-
nificant is that he does not seem to have seen new possibilities 
for science in the sort of work the astronomers were doing. He 
takes what they give him, and his science is deeply influenced 
by the data so obtained; but he neither partioipates in nor en-
courages their studies. He does not here seem to conceive of an 
experimental procedure as an intrinsic part of scientific 
method: experience is received, not created. lit 
l3E•g • Q! ~aelo, II, 12, 292 a, S. For further references 
see Allan. Q! Cae~q, Index, under cio'"CpoAoy { a and A i y\)1['"Co~ • 
14The following passage suggests that in some other works 
~ris~otle saw greater scien~if1c possibilities in experimenta-
tion: "This /:Seems to be the manner in which the generation of 
the bees occurs, botn according to ar6~ent and according to 
what seems to take place among the bees. What takes place, 
however, has not yet been explored sufficiently, but if it ever 
iS t then oredit must be given to sensation rather than arguments, 
and to argwnents only if they accord with the observed, phenomena." Q! Gen. AB., III, 10, 760 b, 27-33. 
16 
Due to this passivity before experience, the Aristotelian 
scientist finds hiu.lself in what may seem to us an anomalous 
position. The accumulation of data or experience. though it 
is necessary to 3cience, is an extra-scientific procedure. It 
will not be the scientist's special work or special competence 
to supervise or to critici:lo this accumulation. Though he may 
sometimes doubt the value of the experience presented to him, 
he is in no position to carry out a radical evaluation of it. 
There is an ambient fund of experience made up of elements from 
common sense, empirical and mathematical astronomy, and tra-
dition, This entire complexus is the scientist's starting 
point: this is his experience. Experience "est la qualite 
I'! .. que l'on se plait a attribuer au vieillard. qui a beaucoup vu 
et beaucoup retenu, mais que l'enfant ne pcss_Me jamais,nl 5 
There are several interpenetrating levels within this experience, 
but Aristotle makes no sustained effort to separate these 
various levels. "II veut se tenir d'une falon constanta en 
contact a.vec les phenomenes, at avec les phenomenes de tout 
ordra, mals i1 ne voit nullement la necessite d'en approfondir 
Itanalyse. tt16 
The second function of experience-... experience as source 
15,Augustin 
cianne, 2nd ed. 
16Ib · d 
-..!... p. 
,,:ar.t.sion, Introduction a la PhYsique Aristoteli-(Paris, 1946), p. 217.---
222. 
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of scientific principles17_-is very similar to the first. Ex-
perience as it is manifest in corum.OIl sense judgments already 
has something of a structure. Dy elucidating this already 
present st.ructure the scientist will obtain his scientific 
principles. Aristotle speaks of the connection between principles 
science, and experience in many contexts. We quote several of 
the more 1~portant passages: 
In each science the principles which are peculiar are 
the most numerous. Consequently it is the business of 
experience to give the principles which belong to each 
subjeot. I mean for example that astronomioal experience 
supplies th. principles of astronomical science: for once 
the phenomena were adequately apprehended. the demonstra-
tions of astron9~y were discovered. Similarly with any other 
art or science. J,." 
What has been said is confirmed by the fact that while 
young men become geometricians and mathematicians and wise 
l7principle has at least two senses, both of which are re-
lated to experience. The first is the fact--~~l ; it is a prin-
ciple in that it initiates science. The second scientific 
principle-- 6l0~l --is the rationale of the tact, its intelligible 
basis. These two senses work into one another, so that it is 
not always easy to distinguish exactly between them; for, as 
we shall see in the case of natural motion, to announce what the 
tact is goes a long way toward giving its rationale. Neverthe-
less, in so far as we can distinguish these two senses, it is 
our present concern to show that experience (which is almost 
equivalent to principle in the sense of ~~, ) provides, or at 
least leads up to, principles in the sense ot 6l0~l --i.e. prin-
ciples of rational explanation. For an extended list of texts 
in which Aristotle speaks ot apxa{ as principles of knowledge, 
see H. Bonitz, Index .liri§totelicus, 2nd edt (Graz, 1955), III b, 
59 - 112 a 40. 
lS ian .. ' - 1 Pr or ~ , I. 030, 46 a, 7-22. For further references, 
see Bonitz, 242 at 59 - b, 10. 
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in nlatters like these, it, is thought that a young man of 
practical wisdom cannot be found. The cause is that such 
wisdom is concerned not only with universals but with 
sin~ulars. which become familiar from experience, but a 
yOl.:.ng man ho.i:;) no experience, for it is leIl~th of time 
that ~i v~s experience; indeed one .<.i. ... ~ht ask this question 
tov. 'fitly a boy may become a ruatherJatician ,but not a philo-
sopher or a .t->hysicist. Is it because the objects of mathe-
matics exist by abstraction, .. "hile the first principles 
of these other subjects come from experience?~9 
We can see the process of transition from experience (or 
principles in the sense ot ~~, ) to principles of deduction in 
the already quoted second chapter 'of the first book of the .lli! 
Caelo. As we shall show later, the definition of the elements in 
terms of their natural motions is !h! principle of the Q! Caelo; 
and the stuff of these definitions is already contained in "the 
phenomena • • • -adequately apprehended. ,,20 t Phenomena' as used 
here has the meaning of humanly interpreted data, and comes very 
close to meaning the same thing as experience. In Q! Caelo, I, 2, 
the adequately apT-Jrehended phenomena are that earth falls down, 
fire rises. and the heavens revolve about us. It is a simple 
, 
matter then to define up. down, and around in terms of a center 
and extremity of the world. Th.is done, and Aristotle has most 
of what he will need fol:' his science of the heavens. 
19N;c. Eth., VI, 8, 1142 a, 12-18. 
20From text cited above, note 18. 'Phenomenon' has several 
senses. The present context makes it fairly clear that Aristotle 
is using the word in the way in which I have defined it. On the 
various senses of the word, see Bonitz. 809 a, 23 - b, 7, 
espe6ially a, 60 - b, 7. 
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We find a similar procedure in the second chapter of the 
second book. Here Aristotle discusses the suitability of using 
categories such as front and back, right and left, and up and 
down as sCientifically explanatory principles. He observes 
that it is pos:;;ible that some of these categories may be thought 
to be merely conventional or relative to the one using them,21 
but he goes on to use them to solve problems which he raises in 
the fifth chapter o.t' the same book. 22 Once again, it is a 
question of principles which can come only from experience 
concei ved in the Aristotelian sense: the ambient ~lOrld as 
already understood by the intelligent man. Such a man will 
make distinctions about right and left or top and bottom in 
speaking of the heavens, and these prove to be the very cate-
gories which the scientist needs for his work. 
Besides the two examples alreadj" cited (i.e. the formation 
of the doctrine of natural motion and the distinction of up 
and down, etc. as significant astronomical categories), we find 
that Aristotle is repeatedly drawing upon a not too clearly 
defined body of wisdom for the progression of his argument. 
This body of' wisdom we will best desc.l."ibe as experience. One 
time he will seem to draw upon a corporate fund of principles: 
"But since the natural movement of the whole and of its part--
2lQ! Caelo, II, 2, 285 a, 2-5. 
22lbid• 5 'Hid 2 l~ t .... 00 a, - ~. 
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of earth, for instance, as a whole and of a small clod--have 
one and the same direction."') Another time his reference will 
be to a generally admitted corporate observation: "But all 
natural bodies which change their properties we see to be subject 
. I-h t .. .l d" . ..24.,. b t' w~..:. ou exc~ pt~on to l.I1crease anU. l.f:l.].Uutl.vu. .. .J.Il 0 n cases 
there is ;.tn important similarity in the pro5-ro:.:;sion of thought. 
un the basis of :.iomething e;enerally known and aciInitted. we pro-
ceed to some SOl·t of scientific conclusion. 
We be6in to see an arbitrary quality in ,~istotlets use of 
experience. He selects what he needs from experience and 
considers that the scientifically significant. The basis of 
his selection is not so much the eXperience itself as the goals 
which he must reach as a scientist. These goals, and 'Che con-
sequent use of experience, will depend largely upon the example 
of Aristotle'S scientific predecessors and the questions which 
25 
they posed for him to answer. 'rhe somewhat haphazard search 
for principles amid experience is sU-s,§;csted by the following: 
"The principles of syllogisms have been stated in general terms, 
2j~. It 3, 270 a, 3-6. 
24Ibid. 270 a, )0. For further instances of this type of 
experience as source of prinCiples, see ~. I, 5, 272 a, 5-7; 
lI, 6, 2ag h, 9-10. 
251 will take up thi~ question more in detail in the fol-
lowing chapter. 
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both how they are characterized and how we must hUl1t for them. 
so as not to look to everything that is said about the terms 
of the problem or to the same points whether we are confirming 
or refuting, or again whether we are confirming of all or of 
some, and whether we are refuting all or some; we must look to 
fewer points and they fiuet be definite.,,26 
It is difficult to state precisely how the scientist should 
move from experience to principles. Particularly in the realm 
of the physical sciences, Aristotle seems to have found it dif-
ficult to elaborate a belleral methodology on this point. 27 It 
would almost see~ that by trial and error, and particularly by 
the accumulation of tradition, the discovery of principles 
within a science just happens and science becomes possible. A 
man finally comes along who uncovers the significant aspects ot 
our experience, and he is able to carry the science near its 
tinal perfection. 
The final function of experience in the scientific process 
is to provide means of verifying the statements of the sci-
entist. There is chronological justLfication for postponing a 
consideration of this use of ~xperience until the conclusion of 
this study, but we may consider it here for the light it will 
26 Prior An!l., I, 30, 46 a, 10-16. 
27J.iansion, Introduction. p. 210. 
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shed on Aristotle's goneral attitude toward and use of experience. 
Aristotle calls upon tv'lO general types of experience to 
verify his scientific findings. The first type is, again, a 
sort of corporate wisdom; the second involves empirical ob-
servation. 'I/e find both kinds of experience in the third chap-
ter of book one in the ~ Caelo. Aristotle has art,'11ed to the 
inalterabllity of the ether, and now goes on to ~how that his 
conclusion is in accord with the universal opinion of men, 
according to which the highest place in the world is attributed 
to the irmllortal gods,; "Our theory seems to confirm experience 
ana to be confirmed by it. For all men have some conception ot 
the nature of the gods, and all who believe in the existence 
of eods at all, whether barbarian or Greek, agree in allotting 
the highest place to the deity, sur~ly because they suppose that 
immortal is linked with immortal and regard any other supposition 
as inconceivable. If then there is, as there certainly is, 
anything divine, what we have just said about the primary bodily 
SUbstance was well said. nZ8 He then calla upon empirical ob-
servation to substantiate the same conclusion: "The mere 
evidence of the senses 15 enough to convince us of this. at 
least with human certainty. For in the whole range of time 
past, so far as our inherited records reach, no change appears 
28 R! Caelo, I, 3, 270 b, ~-12. 
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to have taken place either in the whole scheme of the outermost 
heaven or in any of its proper parts. tt29 It'inally, still trying 
to confirm his orig~nal deduction, he returns to corporate wisdom 
as embodied in l:..l.nguage: "The common name, too, which has been 
handed down from our distant ancestors even to our own day, seems 
to show that they conceived of it in the fashion which we have 
been expressing. The same ideas, one must believe, recur in 
men's minds not once or twice but again a.nd again. And so, 
iraplying that the primary body is something else beyond earth, 
fire, air, and water, they gave the highest place a name of its 
own, aither, derived from the fact that it 'runs always' for an 
eternity of time • .,JO 
Une might auk how the popular theology can be considered 
'experience.,Jl Aristotle's philosophical predecessors were 
well aware of the fallibility of these theological views,J2 
and since aristotle was well aware of the work of these men we 
naturally suppose that he knew the short-comings of this theology. 
29Ibid• 13-17. 
-
JOlbid. 17-24. 
-
JIlt is to be noted that in the text cited above, note 28, 
Aristotle explicitly speaks of the popular religious views as 
experience. 
J2The crlticlsM$ of Xenophanes, tor example~ are famous. 
See H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratlkar, 5th ed. (Berlin, 
19l4l. I, lJ2-IJ1 (21. B 15):--
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The reason for his use of these traditions is, I think, some-
thing like this: solidly tr~diti0nal theological views form a 
part of the underutood world out of which the l;icientist operates. 
They are data. ndmittedly they are data of a peculiar kind, 
and may involve conaiderable error; but where they are service-
able and '.rIhere there seems no good reason for calling them into 
question, .~istotle is ready to consider them as part of the 
complexus of fact with which his theories and their consequences 
are to conform. Aristotle does not thereby commit hiBlself to 
a defense of these relibiou~ doctrines, but as long as they are 
there he s&elnS to feel that he has every ri&nt to call upon them 
when they can be of use. 
Verification is a par't ot the scientific process throughout 
the ~~ Cae19tJJ but the experience involved is never more exact 
or more exacting tnan it is in the texts just quoted. We can 
see, consequently, that verification will not play quite the 
same role in Aristotle's science as it would play in later sci-
entific techniques. In Aristotle, verification functions mainly 
as a means of confirming something about which one has already 
decided or as a dialectical device by which to convince others 
of the truth of one's statements. It does not (and because 
JJFor verification based on tradition, see ~ Caelo, It 9. 
279 a. ~2~JO; II. 1, 284 a, 11-14. For verification based upon 
a generalized empirical observation, see I. 8, 277 a, 28 - b, J; 
II, 4, 287 a, 11; II, 6, 289 a, 7-8. 
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of its vaguely defined nature it could not) enter as .1ih! cri-
terion by which to judge the truth or falsity of onets 1nitial 
positions. 
Theoretically Aristotlo gives recognition to the exigencies 
and the integrity of experience in scientific verification. The 
real world, given only in experience, is the standard to which 
the scientist and his theories must measure up. He criticizes 
other philosophers because, "in the confidence that the prin-
ciples are true they are ready to accept any consequence of their 
\ 
application. As though some principles did not require to be 
judged from their results, and particularly from their final 
issue 1 lmd that issue. which in the case of producti va knowledge 
is the product, in the knowledge of nature is the unimpeachable 
evidence o!' the ticuseu as to each fact. ,,34 'llhere is a modern 
35 
ring to this, but the modernity ought not to be exaggerated. 
~mpirical verification as we know it today is possible only when 
34rb1g • III, 7, 306 at 14-18. ct. also, II, 13, 293 at 
25-28. 
35Duhem remarks: "Arist,;:.rt.e veut que la Physique so it une 
science d'observationj alors ~eme qu'elle utilisera les raison-
nements du mathematicien, elle partira de la perception sensible 
qui lui fournira ses principes, et elle aboutira a la perception 
sensible a laquelle ses conclusions devront se conformer; la 
perception sensible sera. pour elle, la source de la certitude 
at 1e criterium de 19. verite." SYsteme, I. 150. The statement, 
though it certainly has its· share of truth, would seem to make 
Aristotle a bit more of a modern than he actually turns out to 
be. The statement might hold about Aristotle the biologist, but 
Duhem 15 concerned with Aristotle the physicist and astronomer. 
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atrieory can be SHown to cover a totality of experience that is 
carefully defined both in extent and in structure. Before 
verification can be scientifically meaningful, it must be deter-
rllinedwhat is the area of facts to which theory must conform 
36 
and what aspect of these facts must it explain. In Aristotle, 
experience simply does not have this precision. ;ihen he has 
reached a conclusion he can turn to a great mass of experience 
a.nd can draw from it whatever will serve his purposes. 
The data and theories of the mathematical astronomers might 
have provided a field of experience sufficiently well defined 
for significant verification; but. as we shall see in the fol-
lowing chapter, Aristotle's questions are never such as to lead 
to answers th«t could be judged by astronomical evidence. He 
seems to have been working in one scientific tradition, the 
astronomers in another;3? and though he might at times .B!! their 
findings, be never attempted to subordinate his work to theirs. 
J61~ewton. for example, had in the. data accumulated and or-
ganized by his predeC6030rs a field of experience exactly 
limited both in extent and in structure. His theories would 
.have to explclin neither more iI-or less than this totality. His 
fuurth rule for reasoning in philosophy reads: "In experimental 
philosophy weare to look upon propositions inferred by general 
induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, not-
withstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till 
such time as other phenomena occur, by which they ma.y either be 
made more accurate, or liable to exceptions." Principia, p. 400. 
. 370n th~ d~:ffe-:ence b~~ween the two tradit~on3, Gee 3implic~i 
1n Aristotel1S Physlcorum ~lbros Octo, ed. H. D1els (BerlIn, 1a~ ,. 
1; 291, 21 - 292, 29. For the ~ngrrsn text, see Thomas Heath" 
Math!matigs in Aristotle (Oxford, 1949). pp. 14-15. 
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Thus we have considered the three major functions of experi-
ence in the first section of the .lJ.! Caelo. By way of summary, 
let us state what our main conclusions have been. 
(1) Experience--i.e. reality as found and judged by the 
ordinary intelli6ent man--provides the irreducible data of 
science. This data will include not only common sense experi-
ence but the available sciantific data as \tell. 
(2) EXperience will provide the fundamental principles 
with which the scientist will create his science. At this level 
the scientist must wprk actively on experience, discovering 
in the confused ensemble of experience those aspectu which will 
be scientifically fruitful. 
(J) Experience ,funr,,:io.ls in Ii proces:J of verification. 
However. because of the nature of this experience and because 
of the use Aristotle makes of it, verification does not function 
in an absolutely decisive way in Aristotle's scientific method. 
CHAPTER III 
THE QUESTIONS OF THE DE CAELO 
-
The scientist, working within a given totality of experi-
ence, pose3 the questions which he thinks will lead to an un-
derstandiIl6 of that E:ixperienced reality. It has been observed 
that "the formulation of a problem is often more essential than 
its soll.ltion, which may be merely a matter of mathematical or 
experimental skill. To raise new questions, new possibilities, 
to regard old problems from a new an:'J~, requires imagination 
and marks real adVWlce in science_"l It will be the thesis 
of this chapter that the questions of the 12.!!. Caelo are not 
original formulations of problems, that they are rather the 
questions posed for Aristotle by the tradition in which he 
was working. 
We may break down the section of the ]! paelo which we 
are studying into the following major questions: 
(1) Is the world finite or infinite? (I, 5-7) 
(2) Is this world the only world? (I. 8-9) 
lAlbert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, The Evolution of 
Phy§iC! (New York, 1942), p. 95. --- --
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() Is the world eternal? (I, 10 - II, 1) 
(4) Is the outer sphere of the world regular or irregular 
in its shape and motion? (II, 4 and 6) 
(5) Why does the motion in the world take place a8 it 
does? (II, 2.), 5) 
The chapters which precede the firth chapter ot the first 
book, though ot crucial importance, do not properly constitute 
a question. As we shall see 1n the next chapter, Aristotle is 
there rather establishing the principles which will found his 
answers in the subsequent chapters. The actual division which 
I bave made 1s no~ the only one possible. One could, for in-
stanoe, combine questions one and two, and make two questions of 
number toar. The exact lines of division are not important. 
What is 1.por~nt is that the ensemble ot questions bas ita 
roots 1n the historical tradition in which Aristotle the sci-
entist is working. As Werner Jaeger haa observed, the content 
and order ot the questions 1n the ~,CI'12 18 intelligible only 
within the historic setting of the Academy.2 
It would be perhaps impossib1e--certain1y, for our present 
purposes unneceaaary--to trace back these questions to their 
absolutely first sources. ~e shall aim here only to show that 
they point back behind Aristotle. 
2werner Jae,er, Ar1·tQt,1 .. : &.mcSilll.,.tal • .at..t..ba 5U,iI'tHW)t 41! 
~ Dex.AoQlent, tr. R. Robinson, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1948), p. )07. 
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Aristotle considered his first Question traditional. This 
is clear trom the introduction to chapter five: "This being 
clear, we must go on to consider the questions which remain. 
First, is there an infinite body, as the majority of the ancient 
philosophers thought, or is this an impossibility?") The ques-
tion is posed. Aristotle immediately testifies to its importance:, 
nThe decision of this question, either way, 1s not unimportam .• 
but rather all-important, to our search tor the truth. It 1s 
this problem which has practically always been the source of the 
ditterences of thoae who have written about nature as a whole_ nI. 
The reason tor this stress becomes clear when we recall the 
Greek equation of tb.e limited with the intelli~ible and the im-
portance ot this equation in aristotelian1am; the proof, tor 
example, of an urunoved ~over (or unmoved movers) depends on the 
impossibility of an inlinite r.~8s8, and hence depends on the 
answer 6iven to the present question. 
The point which I would make about this question 18 that 
it is a part of an entire intellectual tradition, and that in 
3Rt Gs,la, I, S, 271 b. 1-). 
!i£!A~1~~·1~~·II.t~:rfl.ffl;n~.~Jn~~~B!1&f2~!l~ .. ~mre; 
CItii i\naximenea, Anax mander, and the atomIsts as among those who 
held an infinite world. For a more caretully nuanced treatment 
ot the views of these thinkers and ot their historians, see 
F .lot. Corntord, "Innumerable \iorlds in Presocratic Philosophy t If 
Cla,,1cal QYir~erAX, XVIII (1934), 1-16. 
\ 
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asking and answering it Aristotle did not consider himself an 
innovator. The meana be uses to reach a solution might be new--
that remains to be s.en--but the question i. traditional. 
The second question concerns a tinite plurality or worlds. 
W. do beat. I think, to consider it as a subsidiary part of the 
first question. W. may infer from the rather loose way in 
which Aristotle develops an answer to this question (as con-
. 
trasted with his painfully exact and elaborate treatment or the 
first question) that he does not judge it to be of a8 fundamental 
importance, And indeed it should not be; for a science might 
still be possible on the supposition ot a plurality or worlds, 
but not if there were an infinite number of worlds or it the one 
world were infinite. An infinite would have no first trom which 
deduction could proceed. A finite plurality of worlds seems 
never to have been a popular doctrine in pre-Aristotelian thought. 
Plato SU~.st8 it a8 a possible position in the TAII.MI, but 
seems himselt to prefer a unique world. S It i8 further instruc-
tive that Simpl1c1u8 in his commentary on the Pby,lcl, divides 
all the opinions on the number of world. into two: a unique 
world and an infinity of worlds. He places Plato with Aristotle 
6 
a. holding a single world. 
'Il'1eUI, 31 A-B, 55 C-D. 
6St'Q6~Cl' ~ fblliQQtil, II, 1121. 
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Therefore we can look upon this question and its answer 
as contributing to completeness of treatment rather than as a 
hotly ~isput.d point. This view 1s substantiated by the aca-
demic way in which Aristotle approaches the que.tion: "The 
question might possibly be raised whether there i8 any obstacle 
to our believing that there are other universes composed on the 
patternot our own, more than one, though stopping short ot 
infinity."? 
We need only read Aristotle to learn ot the traditional 
background of the third question, on the eternity of the world.S 
The details of his account and criticism ot his predecessors 
need not detain us bere, aince our present aim is only to indi-
cate the role of tradition in the tormation of the questions 
of the De Caelo. In the present caae, Aristotle gives us all 
the information that we need. 
The fourth question 1s this: Is the outer sphere ot the 
world regular or irregular in shape and motion? Here Aristotle 
Joins a long and rich tradition in Greek thought: 
Le g6nie &reo a1 sensible a 1& beaute qu'engendreqt 
les oombiuaisons gJometrlqu.s simples, dut·etre singuliere-
ment seduit par cette.decouvert~j ell0 tortitia en lui, 
s1 elle ne 1'1 tit germer, l'1dee que le Monde, et par 
7Ra g,.lo, I, 6, 274 a, 26-29; see also I, 8, 276 a, 19-22. 
S~. II 10, 1s entirely devoted to a consideration ot 
earlier theor es about the eternity ot the world. 
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ticulierement Ie r.;ionda cele,st-e sa-t soumis aux regles eter-
nelles des nombres et des figures; elle suscita sans 
douts t, en I fEcole pythagoricienne J 1<1 conviction que les 
cours des astres, quel quten soit Ie caprice apparent, se 
laissent resoudre en combi!1aison3 de mouvements circulaires 
et uniformes; emprun~ee auX Pythagoriciens par Platon, 
transmise de Platon a· I::udoxe, cet te conviction dOIUlera 
naissance a l'Astronomie geOl ~trique; et elle ne cessera 
de dominer les divers systefue~ de cette Astronomie qu'au 
jour ou Kepler aura l'incroyable audac@ de substituer Ie 
regne de It ellipse au regne du .cercle. ~ 
The finalq'Uestion--why does the motion in the world take 
place as it does?--lntroduces a new type of intelligibility. 
It is not here a question of yes or no, but a question of why. 
We are reminded of the Socrates of Plato's Pha;Qg: 
I rejoiced to think that I had found in Anaxagoras Ii. teacher 
of the causee of existence such as I desired, and I imagined 
that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or 
round; and after telling me this, he would proceed to 
explain the cause and the necessity of this being so, 
starting from the greater good, and demonstrating that it 
is better for the earth to be such as it is; and if he said 
that the earth was in the centre, he would further explain 
that this position was the better, and I should be satis-
fied with the explanation given, and not want any other 
sort of cause. And I thought that I would then go on 
and ask him about the sun and moon and stars, and that 
he would explain to me their comparative swiftness, and 
their returnings and various states, active an~Opassive, 
and in what way all of them were for the best. 
In posing what we have called his fifth question, Aristotle is 
carrying out the ~ocrat1c program. 
9Duhem, I, 9. t~ette decouverte' refers to the discovery, 
made by the Pythagoreans. that the motion of the sun could be 
described by a combination of circles. 
lOpnaedo, 97 A - 98 D. The translation is from The DiM-
!ogue, gt Plaio, tr. by B. Jowett, 4th revised ed. (Oxford, 1953), 
, 45S. 
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I would conclude, theretore, that Aristotle was not an 
innovator in posing the scientifio questions of the R! Ci'~o. 
Neither, it se.ma, did he think that originality on this score 
was puticularly desil'able or t scientific. ' At one point he 
does bring himself up before one of his questions and asks 
whether the question wldch he is poSing is a real question and 
whether it has an answer. But he does not try to carry out any 
kind of critique of the question to determine its significance. 
11 Apparently undisturbed, he proceeds to answer it. 
'ii 
We ought also to note at this point that each of the first 
tour questions (and they seem to be more important to Aristotle's 
mind than the fifth) is posed as a dichotomy_ If one opinion 
oan be proved impossible the other will ipso f8ck2 be proved 
true. It the world oannot be unlimited it must be limited; it 
it C&lUlot have a beginning and an end in time then it must be 
eternal; it tnere 1s no possible cause tor its irregularity it 
tollows that it is rel\llar. 
This 'either-or' in the questions will affect the method 
ot invest,igation. There will be no need tor an extensive em-
pirical inVestigation 1t it can be shown deductively, on the 
basis of principles, that one part of a dichotomy is intrin-
sioally impossible. And further, the very nature of the ques-
11 ~ Caelo, II, S, 267 b, 27-31. 
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tiona makes significant empirical investigation almost impos-
sible. One cannot measure the eternity or the infinity of 
the world. One must reason to it or simply give up the sci-
entific endeavor. 
CHAPTER IV 
THEORY IN THE DE ..... CAE;;,;;o;' ""..... L .... O 
We can hardly over-estimate the importance of the ideas 
which the scientist brings to his scientific work, especially 
those ideas which concern what the scientist is looking for and 
how he is to go about finding it. These ideas we may call the 
scientist's heuristic structure. Before the scientist can even 
begin to work, he must have at least some idea about what it 
means to know--to know scientifically--and must have at least 
a general plan according to which he will try to advance toward 
this knowledge or understanding. 
Aristotle had such ideas, and to understand why his science 
is wbatit i& we must discover what these ideas were. 
What does it mean to understand the material world? Plato 
1 (and others, of course, before him) had posed the question, 
and had come to the conclusion that the material world--at least 
viewed preCisely as material--could not be understood. Matter, 
viewed exclusively as matter, was a chaos about which no 
1 Phaedo, 96 A - 98 D. 
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lastingly significant statement could be made. 2 One could not 
say that it was anything in itself. The human mind makes 
statements about the material world--that this, for instance, 
is a man--but it is subsequently forced to negate its statement 
and to say that this 1s something else. If a permanently sig-
nificant scientific ~\tgtement is to be possible, obviously it 
cannot be of the type in which we predicate something of a 
material reality. Scientific statements will focus rather on 
the predicated natures in themselves. The scientist will 
study in thelr inner intelligibility the never-changing meanings 
which we find momentarily reflected in the world of our sense 
experience.3 
Aristotle works within the tradition created by Plato. 
True, there are other influences at work in the formation of 
his scientific methOdj4 but his conception of the structure of 
scientific explanation is, I think, most properly understood 
as a modification from within Platonism. 
For Aristotle, scientific understanding is understanding 
2T1meeu!, 49 c - 52 D. 
3~., especially 52 A. See also Republic, 476 A-D. 
~Richard McKeon has correctly stressed the importance of 
Democritus in the formation of Aristotle's scientific method. 
"Aristotle's Conception of the Development and the t4ature of 
Scientific Method," Journal at. lUl!. H~storY .5li Idea!, VIII 
(January, 1947), 3-19. 
)8 
in terms of four-fold causality: 'material and formal, efficient 
and final. 5 Where he insists upon efficient and final causality 
as necessary for scientific explanation, Aristotle believes that 
he is going beyond Plato.6 In including material causality as 
a source of intelligibility he goes against the Platonic stream. 
But in his use of formal causality he is developing the 
Platonic tradition; and it is to be noted that formal causality 
is dominant in Aristotle's sciences, to the point that often 
7 it seems almost to absorb final and efficient causality. 
Aristotle's runnin6 polemic against the Platonic tbeory of 
ideas can obscure the fundamental continuity between that theory 
and the Aristotelian theory ot matter and form. Certainly there 
are 1mport~t differences bet~ieen the two. In Plato it is not 
the material thine; that is known, but some ideal content that 
in itself is other than this or that partial and momentary re-
alization. Aristotle tries to bridge this gap between object 
of knowledge and the transient data of experience by his matter-
form, act-potency ideas. 
5~. !nil., I, 2, 71 b, 8.16; Phxs., II, 7. 198 a, 14-22. 
6~., A, 6, 9gg a, 7-9. It is at least questionable 
whether Ar1stotle's judgment that Plato knew only two causes is justified. 
7Ibid. t Z, 7. 10)2 a, 24-25; H, 4, 1044 a. 37. See on 
this point Joseph Owens, C.Ss. R. , The Doctrine of ~~3ng in 
Ari§totelian Metaphysics (Toronto, ~l), pp. 22T; .--
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Aris~otelian matter we may describe as that which is never 
itsolt.8 or its very nature it aChieves the statu8 ot being 
only by being sow.ething,9 and thi,s sOlUth1ng that it is will be 
already trana-material. Form is the act ot the matter, the 
perfection by which matter is something. FOrBl, in thus making 
matter real, does not make 1 t "real matter" but rather make. it 
a real thing; tor in the material order, thing, "the individual 
horse or man. nlO material Bubstance, is the only kind ot reality 
there 1s.11 To ask what holds matter and form together 80 as 
to make but one being i8 to misconceive their relationship. 
Matter and form are no~ ~o be thought of as beings tully es-
tablished in themselves, and thus requiring some sort of on-
tolog1cal glue to hold them togetber. In a certain sense the 
matter is the whole being; in another sen8e the form 1s the 
12 
whole being. The torm i8 what the matter 14: it 1s the on-
tological significance of the matter.l ) 
Granted that these two conceptiona of the nature ot material 
a~., Z, ), 1029 a, 20. 
9~., 7, 10JJ a, 24 - 10)4 a, 8. 
lO~., S, 2 a. 1). 
ll!l1., Z, 7, 10)) a, 24 - 1034 a, S. 
12~., H, 6, 1045 a, 20 - b, 23. 
l)on this entire rather intrioate point, see Owens, pp. 
220-225. 
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reality are very much different, we must note that they lead 
to deeply similar concepts of the nature of scientific intel-
ligibility. Both Plato and Aristotle conceive intelligibility 
in terms of what a thing is, the former with his doctrine of 
14 ideas, the latter with his theory of form or essence. And 
where in Plato we find the ascent to the ideas of central im-
portance, in Aristotle it is the definition that provides the 
center of intelligibility. 
With this by way of preliminary, we can now briefly 
describe the ideal form of Aristotelian science. Throu~ induc-
tion and insight we come to a knowledge of the essence of the 
subject of the particular science with which we are concerned. IS 
This subject may be the heavenly bodies, it may be human actions, 
the soul, changing beings in general. In each one we come to 
a primary subject matter wldch cannot be deduced from the sub-
14 Owens, p_ 225: "So in terms of scientific knowledge, 
matter will ultimately be explained in terms of form. The 
material cause, in scientific explanation, has to be reduced to 
the fonnal. The final 'why' in the realm of material as well 
as efficient causality, must be reduced to the form. 
"This does not mean, however, that the matter any more than 
the efficiency can be deduced from the form. • •• But both are 
scientifically knowable only in terms of form, and accordingly 
their ultimate exolanation in a science lies in their reduction 
to the formal cause." Compare Aquinas: "Quicquid igitur est in 
re quod non poteat cognosci per cognitionem substantiae eiuB, 
oportet esse intellectui ignotum." S. Thomae de Aquino, Summa 
Contra Gentiles, Editio Leonina Manualls (Romae, 1934), III, 56. 
15post. ~., II, 19, 100 a, 10; 100 b, 12. 
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ject matters of other sciences, but must be discovered in it-
881£.16 The d.efinition of the essence so reached will be the 
17 fundamental principle of the science. It is the most certain 
knowledge which we can have within the limits of this particular 
science, and \iill become the cauae or intelligible ground of the 
entire body of scientific knowledge. Science, considered as a 
habit of the scientist, will be the ability to demonstrate from 
such a starting point all that is eternal and necessary about 
the subject. Our knowledge will be limited to these aspects 
because only such can be proved of a subject by a deduction 
18 
trom its immutable essence. 
From this brief and general sketch, we can see the central 
- position of the definition. To focus our study of the theory 
of the ~ Cae1q. let us first outline aristotlets ideas on the 
definition and then follow this outline through the work at hand, 
marking the significant convergences and divergences. 
The definition can be seen from two points of view. We may 
consider it as a technique of classification or as the intellig1bl 
expression of the essence of the thing defined. In Aristotle's 
mind these two aspects involve one another. 'tihen he speaks of 
16 d Post. ~., I, 20, 87 a, 38 - b. 4. 
23-25. 17~., II, 3, 90 b, 
18 Ibid., I, 2, 71 b, 9-23. Nig. ilb., VI, 3, 1139 b. 18-)5. 
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the definition it is usually from the second point of view,19 
but he thinks that he will have achieved an enunciation of the 
essence when he has succeeded in classifying it as an infima 
species. 20 The essence is defined in terms of genus and specific 
21 difference. 
But how is the definition obtained? This is certainly a 
crucial question in Aristotelian science. Yet, contrary to 
what one might expect, aristotle worked out no general solution 
to the problem; ItAristote, malgre son gout prollonce pour l'etude 
tll80rique des met.bodes de la science au de l' art, et malgre 
une etude appro£ondie at plusieurs f01s reprises des moyens qui 
perwettent de definir, Aristote nlest point parvenu a. elaborer 
une Inethode ferme de definition. Ce. n' est pas qu' il ne se soit 
, , , . , . ,,22 
fait una idee precise du but a atte~ndre. 
Aristotle approaches the problem of definition in the R.!. 
Anima in the following words: 
As the form of question which here presents itself, viz. 
the question 'What is it?', recurs in other fields, it 
19Mete , Z, 5,1031 a, 12; ~. &!!!,., II, 3, 90 b, 16. 
20post. ~., II, 13, 96 b. 15-24. 
210n the deeper philosophical issues involved in this 
theory of definition, see uwens, p. 210. 
22M. D. Roland-Gosselin, 0.£1., "Les Methodes de definition 
chez Aristote,U Revue des .:icieuces PhiJ;.osophiques et The01ogiques, 
VI (1912), 673. 
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might be supposed that there was some single method of 
inquiry applicable to all objects whose essential nature 
we are endeavouring to ascertain • •• In that case what 
we should have to seek for would be this unique methOd. 
But if there is no such single and general method for 
solving the question of essence, our task becomes still 
more difficult; in the case of each different subject we 
81~11 have to determine the appropriate process of in-
vestigation. 23 
And from the dlrficulti~s which he encounters in elaborating the 
definition of the soul, it is clear that he does not consider any 
one technique as the method of attaining definition. 24 The point 
to be noted in this text is that the definition is not given in 
some sort of intuitive flash. In one way or another it Must be 
worked to. The ingenuity of the scientist will be called into 
play for this crucial step in the scientific proeess. 25 
Aristotle's long treatment in the Tonics of the means of 
establishing and destroying definitions shows him well aware 
of the difficulties and insecurities which his doctrine of 
definition would involve. 26 It is his theoretical view that 
the definition ought to eneender n{o'tl{;J'7 in his hearers, which 
23Ql Animl. 1, 1, 402 a, 11-19. 
24Ro1~nd-Gossel1n. p. 670. 
25ji'r. fi.oland-Uosoe11n gives a schematic break-down of the 
Aristotelian teclmiques of definition, pp. 660-665. 
6 2 Top •• VI and VII. 
27Ibig., I, 1, 100 b, 19; De Caelo, I, J, 270 b, 4. For 
the shades of meaning of this word, see Bonitz, 595 b, 8-59. 
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would mean that the hearers see and grant the definition, not 
merely for the sake of argument. but because they find it con-
vincing. But along with this theoretical position we find a 
practical recognition that such assent is not easily won. 28 
For science as Aristotle conceives it to be absolutely 
certain, the definition would have to be attained in perfect 
clarity and certitude. But he was quite aware that we seldom 
if ever arc given auch ideal definitions. lie Ulust elaborate 
them out of eXperiEillCe by mean~ of d1alectic,29 and further 
debate on their validity will re&ain an a~ost endless possibi-
lity. If we fail to take this into account, we shall be mystified 
by much of what we find in the l2i. Ciel;o. 
We have, then, made the following pOints about the Aristo-
telian definition: (1) It 1s an expression of an essence in 
terms of genus and difference. (2) It is not simply given or 
intuited; it must be worked to. (3) In the concrete, it is 
to gain the acceptance of the audience_ (4) It is premiss, 
mediate or immediate, to all the demonstrations which follow 
in the body of the science. 
In the De Uae10 we find the doctrine of natural motion -~---
28 TOR_. VII, 5. 155 a, 2-18. 
29Pr1or .A!!!!., I, 30, 46 at 18-22; TOR-, I, 2, 101 a, 36. 
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fulfilling the functions of the definition. 
Natural motion is an attempt at an essential definition of 
the nature or natures of the bodies moving in the world. The 
world which Aristotle is trying to understand, the subject 
matter of his science, is a world of bodies in local motion. 
"Let us take this as our starting-point. All natural bodies 
and magnitudes we hold to be, as such, capable of locomotion."30 
Taking this world as a whole, the first thing he does is to 
31 define its specifically different components. Such definition 
will classify according to genus and specific difference, and 
so will enunciate the essences of the bodies involved. The 
genus is bodies in local motion. The differences will be 
based upon the nature of the motion which is intrinsic to the 
various bodies. 
But why does the motion 'and the goal of that motion give 
us access to the very nature of a thing? The answer to this 
question arises out of Aristotle's conception of physics. We 
may define physics as the science of bodies which have within 
themselves an "innate imp_lse to change."32 This physis or 
nature is identified with the form of the physical body:33 
J0Q! Cielo, I, 2, 268 b, 15. 
31Ib,d. b, 14. 
32~ •• II. 1. 192 b, 18. 
33~., 193 b, 3-7. 
the principle which determines what a thing is becoming (i.e. 
the nature) and the principle which determines what a thing is 
(i.e. the torm) are identical in all changeable things. To 
know what a thing is becoming is to know what that thing is. 
Because nature is the principle which regulates activity 
from within a being, we can argue to nature from an empirically 
given regular activity which has no external source. It we 
find that something happens in a certain way always or almost 
always, we can validly reason to some nature as cause. In 
the Q! Caelo, where it is question of local motion, a regular 
local motion will reveal a nature, a natural body. 
But since Aristotle is interested in finding the ultimate 
natures out of which all bodies are composed. he is first ot 
all interested in those bodies which have a perfectly simple 
nature; and these natures will be revealed by perfectly simple 
motions. 
Aristotle has alreadyJ4 considered the problem ot simple 
motions in the Physics: 
In every kind of motion we may have regularity or irregu-
larity: thus there aay be regular alteration, and locomo-
tion in a regular path, e.g. in a circle or on a straight 
line, and it is the same with regard to increase and de-
crease. The difference that makes a motion irregular is 
34The problem of the relative chronologies of Aristotle's 
writings is a difficult one. Whatever the dates of the actual 
texts which we have, it is obvious that the assumption of straight 
and circular as the two simple figures in the Q! Caelo pre-
supposes a previous discussion of the matter. 
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sometimes to be found in its path: thus a motion cannot 
be regular if its path is an irregular magnitude, e.g. 
a broken line, a spiral, or any other magnitude that is 
not such that any part of it t~ken at random fits on to 
any other that may be chosen.J ' 
The identification of the straight and the circular as the only 
simple figures presented no immediate problem in the De Caelo. 
This is clear from the near-dogmatic manner in which he announces 
the fact: "But all movement that is in place, all locomotion, 
as we term it, is either straight or circular or a combination 
of these two, which are the only simple movements. And the 
reason of this is t.uat t.hese t.wo, the straight and the cir-
cular line, are the only simple magnitudes."36 
Once granted tl~t the simple bodies are to be identified 
by these precise motions, Aristotle proceeds to define what 
such movements will be 1n our universe: "Now revolution about 
the centre is circular motion, while the upward and downward 
movements are in a straight line, 'upward' meaning motion away 
from the centre, and 'downward' motion towards it. All simple 
motion, then, must be motion either away from or towards or 
about the centre. n37 The next step is to line up the simple 
movements with the simple bodies. Earth Aristotle defines 
35Phx;s., V, 4, 228 b. 19-25. 
36De Cae10 I 2, 268 b, 17-20. See also, Phys., VIII, 
- ~" 8, 261 b, 2; t 265 a, 14. 
37Ue Cae10 I 
- ., 2, 268 b, 21-24. 
as the body whicn moves toward the center of the world; fire 
is the body wnich woves away from that center. And because 
there must baa body which moves with the simple circular motion, 
we can be sure that there is a non-terrestrial element which 
moves in a circular path which encloses all the rest.38 
In this way Aristotle has established the essential 
definitions of the basic constituents of the universe of moving 
bodies. The genus is "moving body"; the differences are the 
specific motions or places.39 
The second observation which we made about the definition 
in Aristotelian science was that it is neither demonstrated nor 
simply given, but that it must be worked to. This is notably 
true in the ~ Caelo. The exact process by which Aristotle 
came upon his definitions was perhaps never put down, 40 but 
38Ibid • 269 a, 2-7. Is tilis argument simply a saltus from 
the geometrical to the physical order? Perhaps. but it seems 
not. ~ucn, at least, is not the only possible interpretation. 
The argument seems rather to be from the fact of bodies moving 
in a circular or near-circular way to the conclusion that 
there is some real body to which such motion belongs by nature. 
That the fact of such motion was an assumption common to both 
Aristotle and his audience is clear from De Caelo, I, 5. 272 a, 
5-9. See also Duhem, I, 9. --
39For the ambiguity consequent upon Aristotle's failure 
to define natural bodies consistently in terms of place g£ 
motion, see below, p. 58. 
40Jaeger, p. 300, argues that the note of triumph with which 
Aristotle exploits the idea of natural motion indicates that it 
was a new discovery for Aristotle and his circle. 
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we might reconstruct it somewhat as follows. 
The experientially given contains, among its many details, 
the fact that earth moves downw.rd, etc. It is this welter 
of experience that must be made to yield answers to the scien-
tist's questions, and this must be done through the medium 
of eSl:lenti«ll definitions. ;;>ince the problems all involved 
moving bodies in our universe, i~istotle may have received some 
hint that precisely here would be found the generic definition 
which he would need. "Let us take this as our starting point. 
All natural bodies and magnitudes we hold to be, as such. 
capable of locomotion.,,4l Add to this his ideas on the nature 
of the geometrically and physically simple figures, and he 
could mark out the significant distinctions aH!ong the various 
bodies. Looking back, we might find this progression of thought 
fairly simple, in a way almost inevitable. But for the man 
working out the theory for the first time, it involves a bold 
insight into an undifferentiated assembly of facts in order to 
fix on this or that as the scientifically fruitful. Not every-
thing is fruitful, and it is for the scientist to determine 
what is. In the Q! Caelo, Aristotle's decision as to what is 
significant results in the doctrine of natural motion. 
I • 
41~ C&e~9, 1 2 268 b, 15-16. tAs such' translates xa8 au~d. It 1s difficult to say how much emphasis and how precise 
a meaning Aristotle intends for the expression. Cf. Bonitz, 
369 b, 43-61. 
;0 
But since it is a difficult and often somewhat ha~ardous 
labor for the scientist to establish his basic definition, 
the question ~aturally arises: What attitude does he expect 
his definition to engender in his auditors, those who are 
collaborating in his scientific endeavor? 'l'he definition is 
the foundation of the entire science. It would seem therefore 
tbat it should lead to an absolute certitude. Otoerwise, how 
could science be science? Viewing matters in the abstract, we 
might suppose that Aristotle assigned to the definition just 
such a certitude. However, it we study the text of the Q! 
Caelo, and try to correlate it with hints gathered from various 
other works, we find at least an ambiguity on the point. In 
fact, it seems that Aristotle was willing to g~ant that at times 
the fundamental principles of a science were merely the best 
available and perhaps not all that the scientist would like 
them to be. 
There is frequent reference to the initial definition 
throughout the Q! Caelo. Jometimes these references do not 
even hint that the starting point was in any way problematic. 42 
Just as often, however, there is a note of uncertainty: not that 
Aristotle would call into question the validity of his starting 
point, but he does seem to recognize that his procedure does not 
~uar.ntee toe impossibility of error at this fundamental point. 
42Q! eaelQ, It S, 276 b, 4-10. 
51 
'1'he following text.s illustrate this attitude: 
~ver1 body must necessarily be either finite or infinite, 
and if infinite, eitber of similar or of dissimilar parts! 
If its parts are dlssindlar, they must represent either 
a finite or an infinite number of kinds. That the kinds 
cannot be infinite is evident, if our original presup-
positions remain unchallenged.43 
The result is that we must either abandon our present 
assumptions or assert that the centre and the extremity 
are each numerically one. But this being so, the heaven, 
by the same evidence and the ~~me necessary inferences, 
must be one only and no more. 44 
The reasons why the primary body is eternal and not 
subject to increase or diminution! but unaging and unal-
terable and unmodified, will be c ear from what has been 
said to anyone who believes in our assumption8~45 
Even more decisive than these texts is the following: "In 
general, our quarrel with those who speak of movement in this 
way cannot be confined to the parts;- it concerns the whole 
universe~ One must decide at the ,outset whether bodies have 
a natural movement or not" whether there is no natural but only 
4j!i!9.~ I, 7, 274 A,' 30 ... 34. The last sentence in the 
Greek reads: &'t, ""tv 'totvuv 06x 010'11 'tl ,~ 41lI{pCA»v I fPClVlPOV, 
Ii 't" '}""rv 'dol, ""'V,, v 'tel, .. p~Cl' d1loeial l ,. 
44 . lQisl. I, a, 277 a, 9-13. C:S, &'VClyx4rav ft Xl Very 'tCl'\J'tCl' 
'td,d1loSfoe,', ~ 'to ""laov Iv ITv4l X4: 'to IUXCl'tOV. ~od'tou o'3V-to' 
4vdyx~ xal 't&v O~pClVoV IVCl ~ovov elva, xd, ~~ ~Aelou', 'tor, Cl~'tOr' 
'tIX",,~to,' ~Od~Ol' XCll 'tClr, ~'~ar, 4vdYXUl'. 
45Ib1d. I, 3, 270 b, 1-4 .• AH~'tl t.:.iv o~v 4lolov xa.l 06't' 
Q,G(~a,v Ixov 06't1 .alolv ••• 'O'tL 'to .. p~ov 'tQv a~~wv, I, 't" 
'tor, dxoxu ""ivo, , 'll&O'teuel, cpa.vcpov 'x 'tii.)v etpTJ6.LivCA»v 'O'ttv. 
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constrained movement. Seeing, however, that we have already 
decided this matter to the best of our ability, we are entitled 
to treat our results as representing fact.,,46 
As suggestive as this last, though of a more general nature, 
is this passage from the first chapter of book three: "Dis-
cussion of the other views may be postponed. But this last 
theory which composes every body of planes is, as the most 
superficial observation shows, in ma~y respects in plain contra-
diction with mathematics. It is, however, wrong to remove the 
foundations of a science unless you can replace them with others 
more co~v1ncin6.,,47 
These, texts represent, I believe, Aristotle's working 
.. 
attitude toward the scientific endeavor. He seems to look upon 
science as a difficult, often imperfect thing. It depends en-
tirely upon a foundation (the definition), but the human mind 
46l!W!. II" ll, 294 b i 30 - 295 a, 2. &l.~ 0& 1tpO' 'fo.)' 
oJ't1l) l.iyaY'tt' 1ttpl 'f1)' ",vl}aell)' a6 1ttP~ ~oplCA)v 'en;v 1) 4~"Ha­
~~~aa', 41.l.d xtpl &Aou 'f&VO' x,,: ~"Y'f&'. '~4px~ yap Olopleniav 
1(M&p&Y 'en( 'ta' 'faf' ~"a, ,dae& x/y~a,' YJ 060e~t", 1<.0.; x&'fepov 
,dot, ~,y 06x CO'fI, ~(ct o'IO'fIY. ,4xel 0& ,upl 'fad'fwv OU~~HO'ta.1 
1(PO'ftpov ~04 xa.'td 'fl}v x4paGOUY OdVa.~lY erxo~ey, xp~O'fioy W, 
uXc(PXOUOIV. 
471bid,e lIlt 1, 299 at 1-6. The last sentence reads: x«{'tal 
O{x,,& 0'11 ~v ~ ~f) xLvefy tl X& cno'tipo,', «6'fa. Aoyal (" '" yefy 'f~v uxa-
eiaeCA)v. 
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often reaches this foundation in a very imperfect way. 
And when it COmes to a science of the heavenly bodies, 
Aristotle recognizes special difficulties and limitations.48 
This diffidence. already present in the R! Ca.lo, is underlined 
in a work of later origin. Because of the importance of the 
text, we quote it in full: 
Of things constituted by nature some are ungenerated, 
imperishable, and eternal, while others are subject to ge-
neration and decay. The former are excellent beyond com-
pare and divine, but less accessible to knowledge. The 
evidence that might throw light on them, and on the problems 
which we long to solve respecting them, is furnished but 
scantily by sensation; whereas respecting perishable plants 
and animals we have abundant information! living as we do 
in their midst, and ample data may be co lected concerning 
all their various kinds, if only we are willing to take 
sufficient pains. Both departments, however, have their 
special charm. The scanty conceptions to which we can 
attain of celestial things give us, from their excellence. 
more pleasure than all our knowledge of the world in which 
we liver· just as a half glimpse of persons that we love is 
more de ightful than a leisurely view of other things, 
whatever their number and dimensions. On the other hand, 
in certitude and in completeness our knowledge of terrestrial 
things has the advantage. Moreover, their greater nearness 
and iffinity to us balances somewhat the loftier interest 
of the heavenly things that are the objects of the higher 
philosophy_ Having already treated of the celestial world, 
as tar as our conjectures could reach,49 we must proceed to 
treat ot animals, without omitting, to the best of our 
48~bii. II, ), 286 a, 3-7; II, 5, 287 b, 31-33; II,' 12, 
29l b, 4- S; 292 a, 14-17_ 
49'As tar as our conjectures could reach.' The Greek for 
this reads: A~Y0V~&' ~& .alv&~&VOV ~~rv. 
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ability, any member of the kingdom, however ignoble. 50 
On the basis ot this text, especially when we read it in 
the light ot the frequently hesitant passages ot the ~ Caelo, 
r think that we can safely assert that Aristotle did not con-
sider the scientific work done in the De Caelg as ideal. The 
human mind is limited and so is its science. When we study the 
heavens. we can achieve only a limited oertitude and completeness. 
It would seem that the rigor of the definition and the 
labor of the scientist-teacher will be proportioned to the de-
mands of his hearers. He will have to labor as much and only 
as much as is necessary to win the assent of his hearers to his 
originating definitions. A more radical founding of a scien-
tific deduction, though it might seem called for by Aristotle's 
theoretical views about the nature and necessity of scientific 
first principle~, is not carried out in practice, at least not 
50Q!~. An., I, 5, 644 b, 23 - 645 a, 7. Jaeger, p. 337, 
sees in this text a sharp break with Aristotle's older attitude 
toward science. and at the same time a program for a new kind 
of study. The entire fifth chapter of the first book of Q! 
Partibus AnlmaliHm certainly manifests a change, but it is 
questIonaBle how radical this change is. The study of animals 
is different from what is going on in the Q! Caelo, but it 
seems, in light of the argument which we are making in the text, 
rather a change in emphasis than a fundamentally new conception 
of science. The present passage from De PartibUft Animalium 
is fore-shadowed by the passages cited-rrom the ve Caelo. The 
difference, perhaps, is that in the biological work Aristotle 
takes more seriously the limitations on human knowing which 
he had earlier experienced and described' in the De Caelo. 
, 
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in the De C!elo. Thus we find deep in the core of Arist~tlets 
actual sCientific methodology a suggestion of the thought. 
structure of the Platonic dialogue: principles derive from the 
common consent of the participants to the discussion. 51 
Such a starting point for science, with its possibilities 
for basically wrong orientations, may seem almost incomprehen-
sible to us today; yet I think that it ties in closely with the 
Aristotelian conception of experience which we have already 
discussed. Through the active inter-communication of minds, 
we are most likely to discover the fundamental truths. If we 
do not find them in this way, it is more than likely that we 
will not find them at all. 
The final note which we have designated as characteristic 
of the definition in Aristotelian science is tl~t it serves as 
the source of all the knowledge within an individual science. 
Though other aspects of the scientific process may involve the 
scientist in greater difficulties, it is in his deduction that 
he does the actual scientific work. "The scientist should 
assume both the existence of his subject matter and the fun-
damental principles involved in it, and he should take as his 
task the demonstration that his principles are connected with 
the class of facts on which his inquiry turns and that they do 
Slcr. Richard Robinsoni SlitO" Earlier Dialectiq, 2nd ad. (Oxford, 1953), pp. 77-79, o. 
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explain those facts."52 
We have classified the major questions of the section of 
the Q! Caelo which we are studying as follows: 
(1) Is the world finite or infinite? 
(2) Is this world the only world? 
(3) 15 the world eternal? 
(4) Is the outer sphere of the world regular in shape 
and motion? 
(5) Why does the motion in the world take place as it does? 
All of these questions, in varying degrees, receive ~n answer 
from the doctrine of natural motion. 
Is the world finite or infinite? The question is easily 
answered, once one has the proper definitions. 53 The world can 
be proved to be necessarily finite it its constituent elements 
can be proved finite, and this is how Aristotle proceeds. 
Bodies are divided into straight-moving and circulinear-moving 
bodies. Since it would involve contradiction to say that a 
body of either of these types cou~d be extended to infinity, 
the world as a whole cannot be so extended. 54 
52McKeon, p. 41. 
53Q! Caelo, I, 6, 271 b, 18-25; I, 7, 274 a, 30. 
54A more general solution to the problem is offered in 1.7. 
Aristotle states here that he is moving out of the range ot 
the science that is his ilWUediate concern, so that the chapter 
is something of an extended foot-note. He at~.~pts to solve 
the problem on the basis of an analysis of the possibility of 
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Involved with the question of the infinity of the world 
1s the question of a possible plurality of worlds. Granted that 
an actual infinite is impossible, is there any reason to think 
that the world that is accessible to our experience is the only 
world that there 1s155 
In the deduction of the necessary unicity of the world, we 
see the meaning which Aristotle intends to give to his principle 
A 
of natural motion and place: net peut-etre n'est-il point dans 
toute sa Physique, de probleme ou se marque mieux le sens exact 
qu'il attribuait a ces deux notions."56 The argumentation of 
this chapter lays bare an ambiguity in Aristotle's original 
definitions. 57 In I, 2, Aristotle had determined the number 
of specifically irreducible elements on the basis of the possible 
number of simple motions, but the nature of these elements was 
conceived in terms of the actual place toward which these 
motions were directed. The Simple bodies were properly defined 
interaction between the infinite and anything else. He concludes: 
"Since every perceptible body possesses the power of acting or 
of being acted upon, or both of these. it is impossible that an 
infinite body should be perceptible." 275 a, 5-7. 
55Ibid. I, 6, 274 a, 25-29. 
56nuhem, It 230. For a more extended analysis of the entire 
argument, see ~. 230-234. 
57Z6rcher, Aris~otel~st Geist und Werk (Paderborn, 1952), 
pp. 134-135, takes a harsher view of tha argumentation on this 
point. He concludes: "Dass das reine 30phisterei 1st, muss jedermann zugeben." 
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in terms of their form--i.e. their natural pl~ce.58 Aristotle 
is right, on his principles, to suppose that simple bodies any-
where will have a simple natural motion, and that this simple 
natural motion must be either straight or circular. But he has 
established really no basis for the further position that it is 
imposaible for there to be a greater number of natural places 
than the number given in our world. The view operative in the 
ar6ument about the un1city of the world is that only so many 
natural motions (considered in their geometrical structure) 
are possible; all bodies having the same natural (geometrical) 
motion have the same nature and the same natural place. There-
fore all natural bodies, even those outside our world, will have 
as natural goal the center or the extremity of our world. Hence 
all worlds will become one with ours. The difficulty with the 
argument is that Aristotle has given no suasive reason why the 
bodies of a hypothetical other world could not have their own 
proper natural places. Even the highly sympathetic Pierre Duhem 
observes that the postulate of the specific identity of the 
s~mple bodies of all possible worlds nne tient que par un lien 
assez liche a l'ensemble de sa Physique."59 
580n natural place as form, see Q! Caelo, IV, ), )10 b, 10; 
Duhem, It 207-208. 
59uuhem. 1, 2)1. 
59 
Hut whatever the solidity of the argument, it should be 
olear that it is entirely a deduction from the theory ot natural 
motion and natural place. 
The problem of the eternity of the world finds solution in 
much the same way. In chapters ten through twelve of the first 
book, Aristotle is concerned to show that what is inco~ruptible 
is ungenerated, that what is ungenerated is incorruptible, and 
that both are eternal. The connection between this discussion 
and the principles of the rest of the Q! Caelo is made in chapter 
three of book one. There Aristotle shows on the basis of 
natural motion that the fifth element must be unalterable: 
"And so, if the body which moves with a circular motion cannot 
admit of increase or diminution, it 1s reasonable to suppose 
60 
that it is also unalterable." The step from here to eternity 
1s simply a matter of definitlon.61 The result of the argument 
is that the heavens are and must be eternal and immutable. 
Aristotle brings natural motion to bear on the fourth 
que~tion too, though less directly and exclusively than here-
tofore. The heaven 1s perfectly spherical in shape because 
(among other reasons) it 1s revolving in a circular path, and 
for a non-spherical body to revolve in this manner there would 
60Q! Caelo, I, 3, 270 a, 33-35. 
6lSee Bonitz, 14 b. 15-25, for the meaning of eternal in 
Aristotle. 
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have to be a void and place and time outside the universe, which 
conditions have been proved impossible. 
The ar~'11l1lent is again questionable, since Aristotle has 
shown the im.possibility of these conditions from the fact that 
there is no body outside the last sphere.62 On the supposition 
of a non-spherical, revolving world, these conditions would 
no longer be fulfilled; and so it seems to be something of a 
circle wben Aristotle argues that, "since the whole revolves 
palpably and by ass~ption, in a circle, and since it has been 
shown that outside the farthest circumference there is neither 
void nor place, from these grounds also it will follow neces-
sarily that the heaven is spherical."6J But valid or not, this 
is the argument which Aristotle makes, and we can see that it 
derives from the initial definition of the fifth element as the 
body in circular motion. For the present, that is all that need 
concern us. 
The fifth question is ot a special type. Actually, I have 
summarized two questions under one heading. The Oxford trans-
lator gives the follo,..ing titles to the two chapters involved 
in the question: " .. ihy there is a plurality of movements and of 
bodies within the heaven"; and "Why the first heaven revolves 
62~ Gie1o , I, 9, 279 a, 12-18. 
6JIbid. II, 4, 287 a, 11-23. 
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in one direction rather than the other." Neither of these prob-
lems resolves itself entirely in terms of natural motion, but 
even here the doctrine is still pertinent and fruitful. 
In II, 3, Aristotle sets out to deduce the necessity of 
more than one element in the cosmos. Starting from the cir-
cular body which envelops the universe. 64 he shows that it must 
move about a stationary center. and that this center (since 
stationary) must be of a nature different from the outer sphere. 
Hence there must exist an earth.6S "But it earth must exist, 
so must tire. For, if one of a pair of contraries naturally 
exists, the other, if it is really contrary, exists also 
naturally,n66 And in much the same fashion he proceeds to de-
duce the necessity of air and water.67 With these four elements 
he can deduce generation and at least some sort of irregular 
secondary motion which will account tor the changes involved 
68 in generation. Thus we have reached the necessity of a 
plurality of bodies and of movements. 
6~~. II, 3, 286 a, 11-12. 
6S~. 20. 
66~. 23-24. 
67Ibid • 2g. 
68 Ibid. 2g6 b, 1-4. Ross calls this entire chapter, "one 
of his DOIaest essays in a ~riorl construction." ArisMotle, 
3rd ed. (Oxford, 1937), p: 5. 
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Aristotle approaches the last question which we are to con-
sider with a. noteworthy mixture of confidence and diffidence: 
Now there are two ways of moving along a circle • • • 
and we have already explained that these movements are not 
contrary to one anotbar. But nothing which concerns the 
eternal can be a matter of chance or spontaneity, and the 
heaven and its circular motion are eternal. We must 
therefore ask why this motion takes one direction and not 
the other. ~ither this 1s itself an ultimate fact or 
there is an ultimate fact behind 1t. It may seem evidence 
of excessive folly or e~cessive zeal to try to provide 
an explanation of.some tllings, or of everythingl admitting no exception. The criticism, however, is not a ways just; 
~ shoylQ first gonsidlt ~ tlison ~ 1! for speaking, AD£ ~ what kind i(certainty II loo~, whet¥er human 
merely g£ ~ A ,ore cggent kind. When anyone shal succeed 
in finding proo s of greater precision, gratitude will be 
due to him for the discovery, but . .al present l!!! must !lI. 
gon~ent with ~ nrobable solytion.6Y 
11'0 solve the knotty problem which he has set himself J Aris-
totle calls upon distinctions which he originally made in his 
.Q!. Inces§u An~fI1alium1° and which he has already reviewed in Q!. 
Oaolo, II, 2: 
If nature always follows the best course possible, and just as upward movement is the superior form of rectilinear 
movement, since the upper region is more divine than the 
lower, so forward movement is superior to backward, then 
69~ Callo, III 5, 287 b, 23 - 288 a. 2. The italicized 
words (~alics not n the original) read as follows in the Greek: 
~p4v Oef ~v «t~{ev ~o6 A~yelv ~{o 'a~,v, !~, Ot n&a !Xwv ~, 
XI~&Ue,V, no~epov avapwn{v~ ~ xap~eplx~epov •••• vuv O! 
~O ~elvo~evov p~~iov. 
70~ Ince§_ !a-, 4-5, 705 a, 27 - 706 b, 17. 
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front and back exhibits, like right and left, as we said 
before and as the difficulty just stated itself suggests, 
the distinction of prior and posterior, which provides a 
reason and so solves our difficulty. Supposing that nature 
is ordered in the best way possib~!t this may stand as 
the reason of the fact mentioned. 
Aristotle 1s admittedly on insecure ground here. In order 
~o find a twhy' he must apply categories to the heavens which 
he recognizes are applicable only to living beings.?2 Still, 
he goes ahead and api)lies the categories: the world is intelli-
gible, and if something happens eternally it must have all ex-
planation. To be noted here is that this particular question 
is not answered by means of a deduction from the theory of 
natural motion. liew catet;ories of explanation must be intro-
duced owinb to the exigencies of the question. 
Consequently it will be something of an over-simplification 
to unify an Aristotelian science entirely in function of a 
single definition or set of definitions. In the description 
of the ideal Aristotelian science which we have given above,?) 
it may bave appeared that the Aristotelian scientific technique 
was quite similar to an axiomatic system. Its difference from 
modern axiomatic systems would be that the Aristotelian science 
would insist that its first principles are true and not merely 
useful for the construction of a system. But on closer in-
721bid• II, 2, 284 b, 32. 
7) Supra , pp. 40-41. 
spection we have found that Aristotle does not attain this per-
fect deductive unity. At least one question necessitates the 
introduction of new principles, which have no intelligible con-
nection with the central principles of the science. Also, on 
almost every question, aristotle is not content merely to de-
duce an answer from natural motion and then pass on. If he 
can, he brings in subsidiary arguments based upon different 
principles. 74 When possible, he shows that his conclusion 1s 
in harmony with principles which his auditors already hold.75 
Thus, it we would understand the unity of Aristotle'S actual 
scientific procedure in the R! Caelo, we must understand it 
from the point of view of the questions posed and within the 
dialectical context in which Aristotle was thinking and working. 
Aristotle discovers his questions ready-formed, and both he and 
his hearers want answers to these questions. His work as a 
scientific thinker will be to discover a basis for answers to 
these questions and to convince his interlocutors of his prin-
ciples and his answers. within the framework of the plurality 
of questions wnich ae mu~t answer, Aristotle attempts to 
elaborate a single source of intelligibility--his doctrine of 
natural motion--but if this single principle does not suffice tor 
the proposed questions he will introduce subsidiary principles. 
743e8 , for example, all of I, 9. 
7S~. It J. 
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The labor of the scientist will thus not be merely to articulate 
the latent intelligibility of an original definition. 
This primacy of the question and the dialectical context 
of scientific work will also account for the often strained 
reasonings which we have already remarked in the De eaelo. 
The juggling with the concepts of natural motion and place in 
order to deduce the unicity of our world is incomprehensible in 
so able a discoverer of logical fallacies, if we suppose that 
all that he is trying t~ do is to see where his principles 
logically lead him. 
But if we brant this primacy to the question we are faced 
with a f~d~ental problem: What sort of knowledge or certitude 
did Aristotle thir~ he could attain by this sort of procedure? 
Let us tirat enunciate the problem more in detail. 
rt we suppose that Aristotle begins a scientific treatise 
with a definition about which there can be no question, and that 
he then proceeds via dcductivc syllogism to enunciate all the 
latent intelligibility of that definition, then we can only 
suppose that the certitude of the science so constructed will 
be absolute, as unquestionable as the original definition. But 
if we approach from the opposite end and suppose that Aristotle 
is first faced with questions and that he must then construct 
a theoretical system which will yield scientific answers, the 
problem is not 50 easily solved. 
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We are, since the seventeenth century, familiar with two 
ideals of scientific certitude. The first, incarnate in Des-
cartes, would involve two fundamental activities, intuition and 
deduetion:"IPraeter intu1twa, hie alium adjurucimus cognoseend1 
modum, qui fit per deductionem: per quam intelligimus illud omne 
quod ex quibusdam aliis certo cognitis necessario eoncluditur."76 
This procedure would result in a body of scientific knowledge 
all of which would have the certainty of intuition. 
The second ideal is that provided by Newton and by the 
many men who led up to him or followed his example. We have 
already quoted the highly characteristic fourth rule of 
reasoning in philosophy, but it is again pertinent here: "In 
experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions inferred 
by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly 
true, notwithstanding ~ny contrary hypotheses that may be 
imagined, till such time as other phenomena occur, by which they 
may either be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions."77 
Beginning with carefully defined data. this approach would have 
one work ~ principles, in the sense that a prinCiple will be a 
single formula unifying all (or nearly all) the phenomena. It 
has no inner necessity or intelligibility. The only reason 
ed. c~iH*ta~e@i~laii¥RRWe~i"lfi;~ ~~M*'~§X~38ft!cartes, 
77Newton, Prinq1p1a. p. 400. 
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for affirming the principle is that it is adequate for the 
phenomena as we now know them. Certitude reached by this 
technique n~kes no claim to finality: it is avowedly open to 
new and radical re-!ormulation whenever the phenomena outgrow 
the principle.7S 
Aristotle's Q! ~C~a~e;l~o refuses to fit into either of these 
later classical patterns. He does not begin with an intuited 
principle, at least not in the sense of a Cartesian clear and 
distinct idea. Instead, from the beginning he is committed to 
answer questions; and though he knows from his more basic re-
79 
searches that all questions have answers, he has no a priori 
guarantee that he will be able to discover those precise prin-
Ciples that could give him the true answers. Further, even 
when he has discovered principles which yield An answer to a 
question, it is not always evident that this is the answer to 
SO 
the question. Uis is thus not a Cartesian rigor. 
Nor does his science derive its certitudes from its em-
7SFor a brief sketch of the classical seventeenth century 
scientific methodologies. see A. C. Crombie, Robert Grosseteste 
inQ ,he orifins of EXp!rimenta, Scienc!, 1100-1700 (Oxford, 
1953 , pp. 03-319. 
79This statement is certainly fifpliste, yet I think that 
it does express something of the sp r t In which Aristotle 
views the matter. 
80er• ~ Caelo, II, 5, 267 b, 30; ~. !nal., I, 9, 76 a, 
26-30. 
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pirical applicability. This we have already seen in our study 
of the nature and place of verification in Aristotle's scientific 
procedure. Owing to the nature of the questions and the tech-
niques of investigation, the scientific answers which Aristotle 
reaches will not be such that experienoe will testify in a 
decisive manner either to their truth or falsity. When one has 
proved the eternity of the world by the theory of natural motion, 
it is not likely that one can then verify the conclusion in 
experience and thereby reflect an empirical certitude back 
upon one's principles. 
The problem grows more decisive when we realize that 
Aristotle was certainly aware of it. He realized the over-
whelming difficulties involved in establishing one's basic 
definitions: "It is clear also that the easiest thing of all 
is to overthrow a definition.,,81 Further, it is significant 
that Aristotle considered at least one of the questions which 
he considers in the Q! Ca,lo to be a dialectical question (as 
contrasted with a scientific question). "Dialectical problems 
also include questions in regard to which reasonings conflict 
(the difficulty then being whether so-and-so is so or not, there 
being convincing arguments for both views); others also in re-
gard to which we have no argument because they are so vast, and 
81 !22., VII, 5, 155 a, 2-3. 
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we find it difficult to give our reasons, e.g. the question 
whether the universe is eternal or no: for into questions of 
that kind too it is possible to inquire. nS2 
It is in Aristotle's idea of dialectic that we shall, r 
think, find some answer to the problem and shall thereby dis-
cover something of the inner intelligibility of the M! Caelo. 
Aristotle gives his fundamental statement of the nature of 
dialectic in the following passage from the TORies. 
Now reasoning is an argument in which, certain things 
being laid down, something other than these necessarily 
comes about through them. (a) It is a 'demonstration t , 
when the premisses from which the reasoning starts are 
true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them 
has originally come through premisses which are primary 
and true: (b) reasonin,_ on tbe other hand, is 'dialec-
tical t , if it reasons from opinions that are generally 
accepted. Things are 'true' and 'primary' which are be-
lieved on the strength not of anything else but of them-
selves: for in regard to the first prinCiples of science 
it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore 
of themj each of the first principles should command belief 
in and by itself. On the other hand, those opinions are 
'generally accepted' which are accepted by everyone or by 
the majority or by the philosophers--i.e. by all, or by 
the majority, or by the most notable and illustrious ot 
them. 63 
What should be noted here 1s the proximity of the origina-
ting sources of science and of dialectic. Dialectic has its 
beginnings in "opinions that are generally accepted"; science 
g2~. I. 11, 104 b, 13-1S. 
83~. I, 1, 100 a, 25 - b, 23. 
70 
derives from sources that are "true and primary," and "which 
are believed on the strength not of anything else but of them-
selves." In theory, nothing could be clearer; but we must not 
overlook the fact that for Aristotle 8c',n,ifig principles e-
merge out of experience, and out of experience conceived in 
such a way that it is not easy to distinguish it from the 
"opinions that are generally accepted." 
Science is the recognized ideal of intellectual activity--
science with its unquestionable certitude. But we must not see 
dialectic as something opposed to science as falsity to truth. 
It is, rather, analogous to science. The natural dynamism of 
dialectic will be to strive to turn itself into science by 
reaching for more and more evident and cogent principles; and 
the exact moment at which an intellectual system will cease to 
be a dialectic and will become a science will be determined, if 
at all, only with difficulty. In the real order, the order of 
labor and of achievement, it will be difficult to distinguish 
SCience tIDd dialectic. And especially will this distinction be 
blurred if it is true--as we have argued-~that Aristotle starts 
with a question and is driven to seek whatever principle he can 
find. The structure or movement of his thought will thus be to 
find as good a principle as he can for his deductions, and not 
to give primary or initial attention to the exact degree of 
cogency and certitude that his principle exercises. 
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But why did Aristotle think that he could use dialectical 
principles in his endeavor to lay hold of the truth? Two 
reasons, I think, can be offered. The first is developed by 
Fr. Regis in his study of Aristotle's dialectic.84 According 
to this view, Aristotle's use of dialectical principles as a 
means to truth is founded in his confidence in common sense, 
which, in turn, is based upon his philosophical views of the 
dynamic finality and normality of human nature and human 
knowing. In the opening sentence of the MetaphYsics, Ariutotle 
proclaims that man desires by nature to know. This desire for 
knowledge is a natural activity in a sense not entirely unlike 
the falling of earth and the rising of fire. In the case of 
the elements, that which happens always or for the most part 
is a result of nature and hence is ordered to naturets end. 
So it is in human knowing. Where we find the majority of the 
best men agreeing on certain principles, we are justified in 
considering these principles as natural, and hence ordered to 
truth, the end of knowing. The truth of such principles will 
be subject to correction when they conflict with something more 
certainly known, but in the absence of such criteria we are 
justified in working our way to truth with these natural dia-
lectical principles. 
84L• M. R'gis, a.p •• L'Opinion Selon Aristot§ (Paris, 1935), 
pp. 138-139. 
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The second reason is actually just a variation on the 
first, but it is a significant variation and so merits separate 
consideration. It is to be found in Aristotle's view of the 
place of man within the hierarchy of intelligent beings. There 
is a suggestive passage in the 12!. Caelo: "One thing [the first, 
God) then has and enjoys the ultimate good, other things attain 
to it, one immediately by few steps, another by many. while 
yet another does not even attampt to secure it but is satisfied 
to reach a point not far removed from that consummation."S5 
There is a danger here of explaining too much on the basis of 
a single passage, but 1 think that the present passage is per-
tinent to our problem. ~~n1s function in the world is under-
standing the universe. In this he imitates the first, the 
higheat. Yet the present text, though it is primarily concerned 
with the multiplicity of movement in the heavenly and other 
bodies. suggests that in imitating the highest certain beings 
(those of the sublunary world) must be satisfied with reaching 
a point "not far removed" from the perfection toward which they 
are striving. ThUS, if perfect knowledge is characteristic of 
the highest, it may well be that man will have to stop some-
what short ot the perfect knowledge which would be science, and 
rest content with dialectic. 
65 ~ Oaelo, II, 12, 292 b, 11-13. 
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The limitation on human knowing which makes itself felt 
in dialectic is. accordingly, not merely a transient difficulty_ 
'nlougil Aristotle was cle;arly aware of the fact of development 
in ideas. ne did Hot view the process of development as a pro-
gression without end or as a finite progression terminating 
in a perfect comprehension of the truth. The present state of 
science (the state which it attains in the Aristotelian achieve-
ment) is not perfect, but in most respects it is terminal. The 
possibility of a "break-through" seems not to be envisaged. At 
least such would seem to be the case in the ~ Caelo. Because 
of the weakness of our senses and the lack of data, because 
those tllings which are most intelligible in themselves are not 
the most apparent to us, there are areas in which we, as human 
beings, cannot attain to the perfection of knowledge. Hence. 
though in dialectic there may be some imperfections, it points 
in the direction of knowledge. Its answers are perhaps not the 
very ultimate ones, but they are the last answers that we shall 
86 
ever see. 
86This is not to suggest that all of Aristotle's science 
is actually just a disguised dialectic. I am sure that he 
thought ius grasp of the principle of non-contradiction was as 
perfect as possible. But the area of thought surveyed by the 
~ Caelo is not so immediately accessible to human intelligence, 
and consequently this science will have its own peculiar struc-
ture and certitude. It is the laws of tRis structure and cer-
titude Which I have tried to sketch in t s chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
So far we have tried to describe the details of Aristotle's 
scientific procedure. By way of conclusion, let us try to 
synthesize these details by seeing them develop from a single 
attitude, which is fundamental in Aristotle. In attempting 
this, we run the danger of over-rationalizing Aristotle; but if 
we keep this danger in mind and lay no claim to having said the 
final word on Aristotelian science, we may come to a deeper and 
more unified understanding of what we have been studying. 
We take as our germinal idea Aristotle's conception of 
man as a being having a nature. From this point devolye what 
seem to me to be the significant factors in Aristotle's scien-
tific method. 
Man's nature is scientifically relevant in two directions: 
vertically and horizontally. Vertically. man has a definite 
status in the hierarchy of beings; horizontally, he is a member 
of a speCies, part of a community. 
The place of man the scientist within the cosmos sheds 
light on the tension in Aristotle's science between the absolute 
and the provisional in truth, as well as upon the apparent lack 
74 
75 
of initiative or inventiveness that we remarked in chapter 
two. As we pointed out at the end of the fourth chapter, 
Aristotle views manl as "mid-way" in the order of beings. 
Like all the sublunary world, he 1s sUbject to change, even to 
generation and corruption, yet he is at the same time capable 
of understanding reality. 
The hierarchical order of being is an absolute. There 
are principles of being within this absolute order of things, 
and science is an intellectual reiteration of things according 
to these principles or causes. Being has this nocessary struc-
ture; and because science (as an ideal) models itself on being, 
it too has a necessary structure. For Aristotle. being is 
and non-being is not; and to know is to know being as it is and 
not as it is not. Further, because the totality of the real 
is a system--i.e. being is related to being--to know beings 
as they are is to know them in relationship to their prinCiples 
or causes, and ultimately as they relate to the universal prin-
ciples of all reality. Aud because the fundamental cause or 
principle of ~he properties or operations of a thing is "what 
the thing ls." tbe fundamental principle in a science will 
most often be the enunciation of that nwhatlt--the definition 
1 This is Aristotlets view of man and hence of the scientist, 
since for Aristotle the scientist is man par excellence. 
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(AOyO' ~oO ~(~o~,).2 Thus both the fact of the intelligi-
bility of being and the general structure of that intelligi-
bility precede the actual scientific work of the Q! Caelo and 
provide it with a context which Aristotle will not call into 
question and which will not be affected by any difficulties 
or doubts which may arise within the individual scientific 
treatise. 
But though the context of scientific work is absolute. 
the human achievement within that context will usually be only 
provisional, and this because of what man is. There is an order 
in being which runs counter to the order of human knowing: 
"for the same things are not 'knowable relatively to us t and 
tknowable' without qualification.") This inversion of orders 
is simply an expression of the tact that man 1s a subordinate 
part of the universe. The natural order of his thought is 
not the determining order of reality. Hence human science 
will be an attempt to attain to the universal principles of the 
real: "So in the present inquiry we must follow this method and 
advance from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, 
towards what is more clear and more knowable by nature.nAt. But 
2pos t • ~ •• II, 10, 93 b, 29. 
)Phys., I, 1, 184 a, 18. 
41bid• 19-22. 
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often there is no prospect of complete achievement. 
Despite this ultimate falling-short, however, man neces-
sarIly pursues knowledge since it is unquestionably a good. 
For all beings capable of thought it is 1h! good. The value 
ot intellection is as absolute in Aristotle as is the Good in 
Plato: it is good to know the real. Within this context, man 
works out whatever science he can, convinced that whatever level 
he attains is his good. 
Human science, therefore, just like human nature, has its 
a priori limitations. Just as Aristotle did not envisage an 
evolution of the various species into somethlng higher, so he 
did not look for a science that would eternally pro8ress toward 
a full comprehension of the real. There 1s a progression in 
sCience, but it ascends from man to the unmoved movers and finally 
to God,S and not from one generation of men to another and 
so on ad infinitum. 
~tillJ we must not reduce science and man to complete im-
mobility; and here we rejoin the idea of the individual sci-
entist as a member of a species. There is an aspect of Aris-
totle's thought which (perhaps because it did not fit in well 
with the temporal, created world of Christian thought) receives 
5We bypass here the thorny problem of Aristotle's theology. 
The exact number and relative position of the supra-human beings 
is, though important, not immediately relevant here. 
little emphasis but which is of moment here. I refer to Aris-
totle's cyclical theory of intellectual history. According 
to this theory, human intellectual achievement is an eternally 
repeating process. llilankind repeatedly comes into possession 
of its intellectual fullness, and then, for whatever,the cause, 
loses it again. Aristotle nowhere develoi)S the theory at 
lengtn, at least not to my knowledge, but he periodically refers 
to it as to something r.ther generally recognized and held: 
"For the same opinions appear in cycles among men not once nor 
twice, but infinitely often. tt6 And indeed something of the sort 
ought to be expected in an eternal universe in which each 
generation of mon is like every other: ttLet us remember that we 
should not disregard the experience of the ages; in the multitude 
of years these things, if they were good, would certainly not 
have been unknown; for almoat everything has been found out. 
although sometimes they are not put together; in other cases 
men do not use the knowledge which they have. It 7 ~vithout some 
sort of theory of cyclic collapse, there could be no intellectual 
history; just as without corruption there could be no generation. 
6Meteor.! I, 3, JJ9 b, 27; De ~ae10, 
Met., A, 8, 1U74 bi 10-13; .f.g!.,-VII, 10, the same effect, P ato, Timaeus, 21 D, 25 
pp. 130-137. 
7PQ1., II, 5, 1264 a, 2-5. 
11 3, 270 b, 19-21; 
1;29 b, 25. See to 
E; Jaeger, Aristotle, 
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Because mants quest for wisdom is a specific undertaking 
(specific in the sense that it is the work of til species) the 
individual scientist will work within the context provided bim 
by "man." The scientist will, in a word, draw heavily upon 
tradition. The world in which man lives is man's scientific 
problem, and hence the data of man's science will be the world 
as assessed by the significant portions of the human community. 
And since man as man is ordered to science, the principles of 
science will lie within this specifically human experience. It 
may take careful reflection to find these principles--usually 
the definitions of the subject matter involved--and one may 
never render these principles quite as clear and decisive as 
one could wi~h; still it is always in the common conceptions 
and experience of men that they are to be found. 
Further, since roau i~ ordered co a search for truth, there 
is ai,nificance in the questions which men ask. It is the 
function of a scientific tradition to elaborate and purify 
questions. The traditional questions reveal the mind of man at 
work trying to undel' :stand the real. 
Aristotle, it Beams, viewed his work as the fulfillment 
of a tradition, a maximum point in one of the phases of human 
scientific history.8 In Aristotlets scientific synthesis, man 
6Again, we must beware of facile generalizations. What we 
say here applies to the Aristotle of the Q! Caelo; but that 
gO 
is aware both of his own achievement and of the intrinsic 
inadequacies of that achievement. 
Too much could be made of the connection between Aristotle's 
theory of man and his scientific metnod. I would certainly not 
argue that the former was explicit in Aristotle's mind at all 
times, or that it was consistently influential upon his method. 
Nevertheless, it provided Aristotle with a context within which 
his scientific method was adequate and satisfying; and it pro-
vides us who are studying Aristotlets method with a unifying 
point of view from which to interpret the constituents of that 
method. 
And if, trom our present study, we seek some insight into 
the later rise and fall of Aristotelianism, I would suggest that 
it is this: the Aristotelian scienti,tic method could survive 
(which is not to say that it necessarily would survive) only 
within a context at least similar to the one provided by ,l.ris-
totle's doctrine of man. If that context were to break down, 
men would soon experience the need for a new science. But 
these matters belong to later history, and, for all their im-
portance, we cannot treat them here. 
aristotle did not look upon science as tully achieved in every 
department is clear from the passage quoted above, p. 15, n. 14: Q! Gen. AU., 111, 10, 760 b, 27-33. 
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